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The Responsibility to Protect principle was created as a response to the Rwandan 
Genocide in 1994 and the Srebrenica massacre in 1995. During the United Nations 
General Assembly in 1999, Secretary-General Kofi Annan contemplated the future of 
sovereignty and the responsibility that comes with it. He implored the international 
community to accept responsibility in the protection of people should the state 
manifestly fail to do so. As a consequence of his request, the Responsibility to Protect 
principle was created as a call to action. This thesis examines the conflicts in which this 
principle has been utilized, compares and contrasts the conflicts with similar situations 
in which the principle was not used, and discusses the factors that could explain why. It 
seeks to fill the gap in existing literature and offer an alternative explanation for states’ 
behavior. The theoretical framework juxtaposes two theoretical lenses, Realism and 
Constructivism, to illustrate that at the intersection of the two is best suited to be used in 
the comparative case study of Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Yemen.  The results of the 
research demonstrate that states behave in accordance to maintaining power and 
resources when that overlaps with upholding norms and values. It is only at this 
intersection that this principle is utilized. The purpose of the thesis is not to provide an 
alternative theory or principle, but rather to demonstrate that states’ behavior can be 
explained through the theoretical framework proposed in this thesis. Also this thesis 
suggests that in order to properly utilize R2P, it should be implemented in all conflicts 
that meet the intervention criteria. By selectively implementing R2P the international 
community is disregarding the original intent of the principle and allowing for future 





The Responsibility to Protect (R2P) principle was developed as a response to 
two major events in the late twentieth century, the Rwandan Genocide and the 
Srebrenica massacre in the 1990s. This principle allows for the transfer of responsibility 
from within the sovereign states to the international community. When the government 
is unwilling or unable to protect the population, intervention for the sake of protection 
is allowed under the standard of R2P. During the 1999 United Nations (UN) General 
Assembly, Secretary-General Kofi Annan reflected on the future development of 
human security and intervention and he explored the idea of state sovereignty and what 
it means in relation to human rights and fundamental freedoms. Such rights and 
freedoms as enshrined to citizens within the Charter of Fundamental Human Rights. 
Secretary-General Annan implored the international community to respond to the 
violations of rights instead of expressing sympathy He challenged the UN member 
states to find common ground on the protection of other people should the situation 
require it. The wording of the R2P principle does not necessitate a mandatory usage, 
rather it is a justification for action and intervention. The principle provides the 
international community and avenue to intervene on behalf of humanitarian grounds. 
Throughout its evolution, it has become more multidimensional. The central foundation 
of the principle was expanded to include intervention on the behalf of mass atrocity 
crimes, like the ones seen in Rwanda or in Bosnia. The main focus of this thesis will be 
to answer several questions- what factors affect the application of R2P principle in a 
state’s decision to intervene? Why is R2P used in some instances of humanitarian crises 
but not in others? To answer these questions, a comparative case study will be used to 
analyze three conflicts, Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Yemen and the resulting response 
from the international community regarding the utilization of R2P. 
 To explain states’ behavior, a theoretical lens will be established through which 
the cases will be analyzed. Two major theories will be combined and the intersection of 
the two will be the theoretical framework. The intersection of Realism and 
Constructivism with regard to states’ behavior is the convergence of consolidating 
power and resources with upholding norms and values. Additionally, three variables 
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will be established and measured: economic interest, social interest, and geopolitical 
interest. Based on this theoretical framework, this thesis proposes the following 
hypothesis- states intervene in conflicts only when material interests coincide with the 
protection of norms and values.  
 The structure of the thesis will be as follows. It will begin with an overview of 
the theoretical framework, the two theories, and the resulting intersection. Then the 
foundation of the R2P principle and the relevant R2P literature will be discussed with a 
conceptualization and operationalization of the variables. Then there will be a case 
overview of the three conflicts: Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Yemen. To conclude, an 
empirical analysis and conclusion will be presented. To establish the variables, 
information from several database will be considered. The Observatory of Economic 
Complexity (OEC) will be used for the statistics on the trade of goods and services 
between countries. Eurostat, a database provided by the European Commission will be 
used for information on the European Union’s (EU) trade statistics. The UN Charter, 
the World Food Programme (WFP), the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data 
Project (ACLED), Relief Web, Human Rights Watch (HRW), and the Humanitarian 
Aid and Civil Protection (ECHO) department of the European Commission will provide 
information on the norms and values that are the foundation for social interest. 
Combining the data to determine the presence of or absence of geopolitical interest will 
create the third variable. Additional research will be from the founding documents of 
R2P, peer reviewed political science journals, relevant information on each conflict 
from both UN and outside sources.  
In the years since, the R2P principle has allowed for intervention by the 
international community if certain criteria are met regarding the human rights 
violations. It has become a justification for intervening in sovereign territories.  The 
current modern conception of sovereignty has existed since the Peace of Westphalia 
was signed in 1648. This treaty changed the way the international community regarded 
state’s rights and their right of non-interference in domestic affairs. The concept of R2P 
stands out as unique for two reasons. First, it was the first major internationally 
organized attempt to draw global attention to humanitarian crises, such as the Rwandan 
Genocide or the Srebrenica massacre. Second, the report published by the International 
Commission on Intervention and State Security (ICISS) redefined the concept of 
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sovereignty by initiating a shift from the more traditional concept of sovereignty to 
individual sovereignty. The R2P doctrine shows a shift from the right of non-
intervention as stated in the UN Charter, Article 2, Paragraph 7, which explicitly 
prohibits intervention in domestic affairs of member states, to the revocation of said 
rights if the states manifestly fail to protect their citizens from internal armed conflicts 
and repressions.  
 The present thesis seeks to answer the question of when and why the 
international community chooses to intervene. Through a combination lens of Realism 
and Constructivism, the theoretical framework will be established. Using a comparative 
case study format, the three conflicts with be compared and contrasted, looking at the 
application of R2P in each individual case, if and when it was utilized. Additionally, 
three factors will be conceptualized and analyzed, economic, social, and geopolitical to 
help establish the relationship that the countries in question had with the international 
community and regional powers. The presence of any or all of these factors will help 
determine the resulting response. The goal of the thesis is not to propose a new 
principle or attempt to propose an alternative, but rather to explicitly demonstrate that 
R2P is selectively implemented and that it should either be utilized in every case of 
mass atrocity crimes, or not at all. When the international community chooses to 
implement R2P only in certain conflicts, they are disregarding the original intent of the 
principle to intervene to protect against human rights violations. Thus, they are failing 
to uphold the norms and values promoted by the principle. Furthermore, it is possible 
that states could invoke R2P in order to intervene on behalf of their own interests rather 




Chapter 1: Theoretical Framework 
 
Within international relations, two of the major theories used to analyze states’ 
behavior are Realism and Constructivism. The first theory explains state behavior as 
actions taken to gain and/or preserve power and resources. The second theory explains 
behavior through the preservation and promotion of norms and values. However, 
neither one of these theories is exactly the foundation through which R2P will be 
analyzed in this thesis. Instead, it is the intersection of these two theories that the 
theoretical framework will be established. It is within this intersection where the desire 
to seek out power and resources coincides with the desire to uphold norms and values, 
resulting in the theoretical framework within which these conflicts will be analyzed.   
 
1.1 Realism  
 
Realism is a school of thought within International Relations Theory which 
attempts to provide a conceptual framework upon which international relations is 
analyzed to provide an explanation for states’ behavior. Realism views the insecurity of 
the state as the main problem within international relations. The state is the only actor 
who can provide security because no other agency or actor is able to do so. There are 
several reasons offered within Realism for why security is scarce and the issues that 
arise when states desire to possess different resources. Realists often propose different 
factors that can intensify the basic security problem, such as multi-polarity, shifts in 
power, and the balance between being on the offense or the defense. Realism oftentimes 
outlines various methods of establishing security including the pursuit of material gains 
to solidify not only the relationship between states, but also the guarantee that going 
forward the economic relationship between the states involved will ensure the 
continued mutual security. A challenging approach to Realism is Constructivism which 
will later be analyzed for the establishment of the theoretical framework.  
In establishing the background of Realism, it is important to understand the 
major branches of the theory and prominent authors whose work is associated with 
these branches of Realism. The foundation of the theory lies within these authors and 
their contributions. There are three common branches within Realism that include 
Classical Realism, Liberal Realism, and Neorealism. All three branches are similar and 
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ultimately are founded upon the same four principles: the state is the central actor, the 
international political system is anarchic and there is no supranational authority to 
enforce rules over the states, actors in the international political system are rational and 
their actions are a reflection of their own self-interest, and all states desire power so 
they can ensure self-preservation regardless of moral objectives. In short, these four 
central propositions are groupism, egoism, anarchy, and power politics (Reus-Smit and 
Snidal, 2008). It should be noted that Liberal Realism does fall within the theory but 
differs slightly with their acknowledgement that norms play a role, which is divergent 
from the way the theory is traditionally defined. However, it is important to the overall 
theoretical framework because of the justifications it offers for the main question that 
the theory seeks to answer, which is what explains states’ behavior? Realism is 
frequently associated with Realpolitik because both theories are based on the pursuit 
for, the possession of, and application of power. Realism portrays world politics as a 
state at war among all states and societies, a condition in which war is regarded as a 
continuous possibility, and that each state has to regard the other as presenting the 
possibility of a threat (Doyle, 1998, p. 20). This is because relations among states are 
anarchic and states are independent units that potentially could act together 
strategically, but some states seek to expand and prosper while others merely try to 
survive.  
Realism is one of the most dominant schools of thought in modern foreign 
policy, particularly because of its rejection of ideology and moral obligation. Realists 
subscribe to a strain of thought that is centered around ego. Realists believe mankind is 
not inherently benevolent, rather it is self-interested and competitive. Many theorists 
share this perspective including Thomas Hobbes who feels that human nature is 
egocentric, but not necessarily selfish and we are guided by the desire to pursue more 
power to become more self-reliant. When taken into perspective of states, theorists 
emphasize that states accumulation of power is an attempt to ensure security in an 
anarchic world with little guidance. The accumulation of power can include coercive 
tactics to obtain material resources necessary for state security and these coercive 
techniques might be harmful to other individuals or states, such as fighting in a war 
with another state. Realism is centered around the sovereign nation, which is the most 
important player. The state is independent and acts on behalf of itself, utilizing military 
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capacities to demonstrate its power capabilities. Additionally, most realists believe that 
supranational institutions, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, 
or other cross-national actors hold little influence over the state because of a lack of 
authority to follow through.  
Within the notable branches of Realism (Classical Realism, Liberal Realism or 
the English School, and Neorealism) there are the same underlying principles, but a few 
distinct differences. Classical Realism emphasizes the nature of human’s involvement 
in states’ behavior. Several prominent classical realists include Hans Morgenthau, 
George Kennan, and Reinhold Niebuhr, all three of whom are considered to be the 
leading American realists in the post-WWII period. Among Morgenthau’s many 
contributions to the Realism school of thought, he published a piece called Politics 
Among Nations which offered six principles of political realism. The first principle is 
that politics is governed by objective laws that are rooted in human nature and in order 
to improve society, it’s important to understand the laws by which society is ruled. The 
second principle is that the concept of interest is defined in terms of power. The third 
principle is that while realism assumes that power is an objective category, it is not 
inherently a fixed category. The fourth principle is that political realism is aware of the 
moral significance of political action and the inescapable tension between moral action 
and the requirements of successful political action. Realism maintains that there must 
be a balance between consequences of actions taken and conformity to moral law. The 
fifth principle is that political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a state 
with the moral laws that govern the universe and it distinguishes between truth and 
opinion. The sixth and final principle is that political realists maintain the autonomy of 
the political sphere, defined in terms of power and interest, of the conformity of action 
in relation to the legal rules (Morgenthau, 1978, p. 4-15).  
Kennan is known for his application of realism in policy with his advocacy of 
containment policy towards the Soviet expansion after WWII. He felt that the Soviet 
Union should be regarded as a great power whose attempts to spread communism 
throughout the world should not be seen as spreading ideology, but rather as 
consolidating power and resources through their occupation in other countries. He was 
a strong believer in Realpolitik and felt that power politics should be dealt with 
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dispassion, and without moralism. The primary obligation of foreign policy is to the 
interest of national society and not its impulses (Krauthammer, 1989).  
Among the many things Niebuhr is known for, he is widely regarded as the 
developer of the philosophical perspective Christian Realism. He contributed to 
political philosophy by including the resources of theology to argue for political 
realism. His work inspired many scholars of the time to move away from idealism and 
embrace realism. He was a player in American foreign policy during the Cold War and 
supported containment in regard to the Soviet Union. His position was that 
Communism is “an organized evil which spreads terror and cruelty throughout the 
world” (Berke, 1992) and he understood that it was a perverse form of Western 
idealism which had taken on a different form due to the democratic complicity and 
wrongdoings which led to the existence of the ideology. Christian Realism is known to 
be partly within both Classical Realism and Liberal Realism, with the former centered 
around the human nature and the latter centered around the international system.  
Liberal Realism is also known by other names, such as the English school or 
Rationalism. The main focus of Liberal Realism is that the international system, while 
anarchical, forms a society of states in which common norms and interests allow for 
order and stability. This idea is at odds with a strict realist view which holds no faith in 
the anarchical system because there is no authority figure to hold any state responsible. 
There is tension within Realism about whether or not Liberal Realism still qualifies 
because of the incorporation of norms and interests but for the theoretical framework of 
this thesis, it will be included. If the framework only included Realism then it would be 
disregarded but for the purpose of explaining states’ behavior, it will be included 
because Constructivism is also incorporated into the theoretical framework. 
A major household name in Liberal Realism is Hedley Bull who argued in his 
book, The Anarchical Society that states behave as parts of a whole when they have a 
sufficient degree of interaction (Bull, 2012, p. 9-10). The interaction can take the shape 
of cooperation, conflict, neutrality, or even indifference in regard to the other’s 
objective. The interactions between states can be political, strategic, economic or social 
in nature (Bull, 2012, p. 10). Another prominent Liberal Realist, Martin Wight took the 
international states system model and expanded upon it. He proposed a new model, the 
‘suzerain-state system’ which takes the relationship between sovereign states and adds a 
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new layer, with one state asserting and maintaining authority over the rest of the states. 
He is famous for his book Power Politics which purports that international law is weak, 
unclear, decentralized and unpoliced. International law is grounded in treaties and they 
are only enforceable to those who are party to them. International law has no agents to 
enforce it, only the states themselves and has no true judiciary element (Wight, 1978, p. 
108-109). He argues that war and revolution go hand in hand and international politics 
is really ‘power politics’ (Wight, 1978, p. 102).  
Barry Buzan is another noteworthy Liberal Realist who questions the 
‘Westphalian’ tendencies that classic realist thinkers tend to have. Buzan holds the 
opinion that most International Relations theory presupposes particular aspects of 
Westphalia and that the world is divided neatly into sovereign and autonomous boxes 
called states, but that most of history does not support this type of international system. 
Along with Ole Wæver, they developed ‘Regional Security Complex Theory’ which 
approaches states’ behavior and motivations from a security standpoint. They posit that 
global powers’ security interests are fundamentally regional in nature. They argue that 
natural barriers exist, such as geographical limitations like oceans or mountains, or even 
individual state barriers that change the security power dynamic within the international 
system (Buzan and Wæver, 2003). Essentially, this theory approaches security and 
interests based in a geographical setting, where in certain situations, it is impossible for 
states to completely maximize their security because it is physically impossible to do 
so, from a geographical standpoint. Although Wæver does not fall under the umbrella 
of Realism, he is included because of his contributions with Buzan. Major aspects of 
the theory that they developed are incorporated into the theoretical framework for this 
thesis because of the emphasis on security as a motivator for behavior. The argument 
that states are more concerned with their region and immediate neighborhood is a key 
part in establishing geopolitical interest.  
Neorealism differs from Classical Realism in the anarchical structure of the 
international system. Neorealists argue that states are the primary actor because there is 
no political force existing above a sovereign nation. They focus their attention on what 
is below the state rather than above, on the supranational level. They view the 
international system as a structure acting with the individuals below the level of the 
state. It also differs on the emphasis on the permanence of conflict. To ensure security, 
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states must be constantly on guard for conflict and build up their economy and military. 
Notable Neorealists include John Mearsheimer, Kenneth Waltz, and Robert Jervis.  
Mearsheimer proposed the theory of offensive realism which holds that 
aggressive state behavior in international politics is caused by the anarchical nature of 
the international system. It depicts great powers as power-maximizers whose ultimate 
aim is to dominate the international system. When Mearsheimer proposed this theory, 
his intent was to fix the status quo bias of Waltz’s Defensive realism which was based 
upon five central assumptions. First, great powers are the main actors in the anarchical 
international system. Second, all states possess some offensive military capability. 
Third, states can never be truly certain of the intentions of others. Fourth, state survival 
is the primary goal. And fifth, states are rational actors that strategically plan to 
maximize their survival prospects. Defensive realism is founded in the preservation of 
state security through the pursuit of defensive strategies (Lobell, 2010, p. 3.). 
Mearsheimer’s theory explains that the interaction between great powers is dominated 
by the desire to achieve hegemony in a world of insecurity, established in rational 
thought. Both Waltz and Mearsheimer are Structural Neorealists which holds the nature 
of the international structure is defined by anarchy and delineated by the distribution of 
capabilities in a decentralized system. Jervis is classified as a Defensive Realist, so he 
tends to follow the school of thought that the international system is created in such a 
way that states are defending themselves, rather than being on the offensive, like 
Mearsheimer theorized. He also proposed the inclusion of psychology into the theory 
which includes the element of human nature when analyzing states’ behavior (Jervis, 
2017). Analyzing states with the inclusion of psychology allows for explanations that 
acknowledge the potential for human error or an added level of emotion that is not 




To complement Realism in the foundation of the intersectional theoretical 
framework, Constructivism will be explained using the core aspects of the theory and 
the major contributing authors and their works. Rooted in the true meaning of the word, 
Constructivism is a theory in international relations, which claims that significant 
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aspects of international relations are historically and socially constructed, rather than 
the inevitable consequence of human nature. Norms and values guide the decision-
making process. Usually credited to Nicholas Onuf for coining the term, Constructivism 
seeks to demonstrate how core aspects of international relations are socially constructed 
as they are formed from the process of social practice and interaction. John Ruggie, 
Peter Katzenstein, and Christian Reus-Smit are also regarded as contemporary 
Constructivist theory pioneers in the establishment of the theory in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s. Constructivism can be categorized into three different forms: systemic, 
unit-level, and holistic. Systemic Constructivism follows the Waltzian Neo-Realist 
approach of third-image level of analysis and concentrates primarily on the interactions 
between unitary state actors, which is a de-emphasis on states’ domestic politics and its 
role in the construction of identities and interests, as exemplified by the writings of 
Alexander Wendt. Unit-level Constructivism is generally considered the opposite of 
Systemic Constructivism because the focus is instead on the states’ domestic political 
realm, “the relationship between domestic social and legal norms and the identities and 
interests of states” and by extension, their national security strategies (200, Reus-Smit, 
2005) which is well represented in Peter Katzenstein’s writings. Finally, Holistic 
Constructivism is the intersection between Systemic and Unit-level Constructivism and 
works as a bridge between the international and the domestic in explaining how state 
identities and interests are created. It is widely understood that Holistic Constructivism 
is exemplified by the writings of John Ruggie. The goal of the theory is to integrate the 
domestically established state identities with their internationally based social identities 
into a unified perspective (Behravesh, 2011).  
Onuf approaches the theory in a reconstructive manner in which he begins with 
an analysis of language, rule, and rules in World of Our Making. The approach follows 
a belief that the style of speech (e.g. instructive speech or authoritative speech) impacts 
the type of rule produced (i.e. hegemony or hierarchy) (Onuf, 2012). Complying with 
the rules helps continue the cycle of rule, but with non-compliance comes a breakdown 
in rule and breakdown of norms surrounding the rule. Ruggie is known for his 
contribution to the Holistic Constructivist approach in international relations theory. 
The utilization of the role of norms, ideas, identities, alongside outside factors in the 
equation to determine international outcomes. This Constructivist approach seeks to 
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explain the post-WWII economic system among the Western capitalistic states by 
analyzing internal and external factors. This was a shift from the realist claim that 
international politics was shaped by rational-choice behavior and egotistical states 
pursuing their own interests. Katzenstein concentrated on the relationship between 
culture, identity, religion, and regionalism in the interstate system, especially with 
consideration to national security. This focus on specific norms was an attempt to 
explain behavioral choices made to ensure security, keeping certain identifying aspects 
integral to the security in mind. He is well known for his analysis of Japan in relation to 
their foreign policy shift before 1945 and after, in Japan’s National Security: 
Structures, Norms and Policies. He argues that the domestic normative structure of 
Japan’s militaristic foreign policy that was favored before the war changed as a 
consequence of the war. The military was severely weakened and thus a shift to favor 
pacifism occurred based on the “structure of the state both broadly conceived and the 
incentives it provides for policy, and on the other hand by the context of social and 
legal norms that help define policy interests” (Katzenstein and Okawra, 1993, p. 86).  
Wendt is famous for his advocacy of Social Constructivism within the field of 
international relations. Social Constructivism takes the position that social interactions 
between individuals and the relationships that are formed, construct human 
development. In Anarchy is what States make of it: The Social Construction of Power 
Politics, Wendt develops a fundamental principle in Constructivist theory that states 
behave differently towards friends and enemies because enemies are threatening but 
“anarchy and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is which” 
(Wendt, 1992, p. 397) because military power holds different significance for the 
countries despite their similar structural positions. The U.S. viewed British missiles in a 
different and less threatening manner than Soviet missiles because of the context of the 
situation. Wendt claims that anarchy has less significance in this theory and sought to 
demonstrate that power politics are socially constructed and thus, transformed by 
human practice. During the Cold War, if the Soviet Union and the U.S. decided to 
throw away their differences and end the war, the war would be over “It is collective 
meanings that constitute the structures which organize our actions” (Wendt, 1992, p. 
397). Constructivism is divided between two major schools of thought: the 
traditionalists who take discourse and linguistics to be paramount to the theory and 
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more mainstream constructivists who acknowledge the impact language has but focus 
more on the interactions themselves as the social construct. Alongside John Ruggie, 
Alexander Wendt, Nicholas Onuf, and Peter Katzenstien, Martha Finnemore and 
Kathryn Sikkink are widely accepted within mainstream Constructivists to be a major 
contributor of the founding academics who established Constructivism as one of the 
major schools of thought within International Relations Theory.  
Finnemore proposed beginning the analysis on the interaction between states, 
their identities, and interests. Instead of focusing on the social interactions between the 
states, she concentrates on the norms of international society and the ways in which 
these norms affect states’ identities and interests which ultimately defines state 
behavior. State behavior is shaped by identity and interest which in turn is shaped by 
international norms and forces. The norms of international society are then transferred 
to international organizations which shape national policies. National policies in turn 
are enforced by the international organizations authority over reinforcing what states’ 
interests should be. Finnemore follows the Systemic Constructivist view that 
international organizations can influence national guidelines by pushing states to adopt 
certain norms and values. She feels that the role of central norms in international 
society explains states’ behavior rather than pure power maximization, as supported by 
most realists. In her opinion, the fact that we live in an international society “means that 
what we want and, in some ways, who we are is shaped by the social norms, rules, 
understandings, and relationships we have with others” (Finnemore, 1996, p. 128). 
These social realities are as important and integral in determining behavior and in the 
political realm and that social realities provide an avenue for utilizing power and 
wealth.  
Sikkink is most well known for her work on the impact of human rights and 
human rights laws and policies on international norms and institutions. In 
Transnational Politics, International Relations Theory, and Human Rights she argues 
that human rights are a promising case study for “exploring and extending a theory of 
norms in international relations” (Sikkink, 1998, p. 518) and she credits Peter 
Katzenstein for his work on his definition of norms as a standardized style of behavior 
with a given identity. If the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the document 
that began the norms cascade, it is clear to her that by signing onto these human rights 
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treaties the international community is accepting certain norms to hold true and by 
extension, creating policies to protect such norms. She recognizes that non-
governmental actors play an important role in the conception of human rights norms, 
but that it is the collaboration between governments and non-governmental institutions 
that leads to the emergence of human rights norms. This is demonstrated in the 
language of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations 
Charter.  
One cannot debate political theories without recognizing Thomas Hobbes as one 
of the founding fathers of political philosophy. He makes three assumptions about the 
state of nature. First, men are equal. Second, they interact in anarchy and third, they are 
driven by competition, reticence, and glory. The conjunction of all three conditions 
leads to a war of every man, against every man, “where there is no common power, 
there is no law; where no law, no injustice” (Hobbes, 1651, p. 79).  Fundamental power 
inequalities generally lead to an imposed hierarchical system, largely alleviating the 
conflict and violence that exist within an anarchical system. But even within anarchy, 
the frequency and duration of violence can be reduced by “constraining competition, 
diffidence, and glory” (Donnelly, 2005, p. 33). Hobbes’ Classical Realism 
acknowledges both anarchy and egoism, that it is unlikely that mankind will cooperate 
in a system without a governing body to provide guidance and control. There are two 
major interpretations of Hobbes’ view of the state of nature. The first, that human 
beings have no concept of right or wrong, in which case, human beings would be 
naturally selfish and amoral, merely attempting to get by for the sole purpose of 
surviving. The second view is that human motivation is more complex and that it is not 
that humans lack morality, it is that morality differs man-to-man. Regardless of the 
interpretation, Hobbes’ teachings serve a purpose. It demonstrates that a failure to 
respect the existing political authority leads to existing in the natural condition of life. 
As with the development of any new theory, there are criticisms from the main 
theoretical opponents. Neorealists are the major opponent of Constructivism because 
not only are they skeptical about the importance of norms, especially international 
norms, but they are also doubtful that states can become friends from their social 
interactions. Neorealists do not deny the existence of norms, just that they are routinely 
disregarded, especially with consideration to powerful states who violate national 
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sovereignty. Realists feel that Constructivists place too much value on social 
interactions between states as sincere and that intentions are always explicit. It is not 
that ideas are more important than power and interest or that they are separate, “the 
claim is rather that power and interest have the effects they do in virtue of the ideas that 
make them up. Power and interest explanations presuppose ideas, and to that extent are 
not rivals to ideational explanations at all” (Wendt, 1999, p. 135). However, 
Constructivists maintain that anarchy is a more complex entity than presented by the 
Realist argument. It does not always lead to aggression or violent conflict and they 
reject Mearsheimer’s claim that realism was the dominant discourse in the period 
between early 12th century to late 20th century because he discounts social interactions 
and the formulation of identity and national interest. They claim it would not be 
possible to produce a precise analysis of the anarchical system during these years while 
acknowledging that it would be difficult to assume that friendships between states 
equals a deep commitment but that through carefully analyzing the degree of 
internalization, this issue can be addressed (Jackson and Sorensen, 2006).  
Another point of contention is the Constructivist view of change because of the 
lack of ability to provide insights as to why discourses rise and fall. Realists feel they 
neglect to address the root of issue. Acknowledging norms and values does not 
necessarily offer a well-reasoned argument for what caused changes in the international 
relations discourse, but instead points to particular factors that may have played a role. 
To counter this claim, Constructivists say that they do study change, just through the 
analysis of social interaction rather than analyzing the same thing over and over again 
(which they claim Realists do) (Jackson and Sorensen, 2006). Both theories offer valid 
lenses through which analyses can be made, but one is more appropriate than the other.   
The R2P principle entails a positive duty, “rather than a duty to refrain from 
doing something abhorrent, it is a duty to do something good” (Glanville, 2016) and it 
requires that states act on the behalf of the international community to protect 
potentially vulnerable people within a state. Applying the Constructivist lens, states act 
because they are driven by their own values of protecting vulnerable people. If this 
were to be the only appropriate theory, states would act far more frequently than they 
do, because they would be guided by the norm to protect those who are in need of 
protection. Applying a Realist lens, states would act because they are driven power and 
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resources, rather than a protection of humanity based on an established norm and only 
intervene in situations that presents the opportunity to consolidate power and secure 
resources. Thus, based on the theoretical debate between realism and constructivism, 
the hypothesis of this thesis is- states intervene in conflicts only when material interests 
coincide with the protection of norms and values. 
Since the 1990s, there has been a “tendency to conflate any military action in 
support of humanitarian ends with military invasion for material gain” (Adams, 2012, p. 
12). A prime motive for intervention in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
region has been oil and this is a factor that influences international interests in this 
strategically important region. Securing the ability to have continued access to oil is an 
important factor to many states’ security and stability. Through the Realism lens, an 
explanation offered for intervention is to further states’ interests, “the structure of 
international relations precludes moral action except where it happens to be in 
congruent with the state interest” (Holzgrefe and Keohane, 2003, p. 149) and 
“governments pursue their interests while paying lip service to the rules” (Wheeler, 
2000, p. 23). In essence, states will not intervene in most situations except when it 
happens to cross the line into one of material gain and moral obligation. In this case, 
states will react and intervene because it is at the intersection of protecting the innocent 
and benefiting the future relationship between the states involved all the while securing 
the access to whatever material interest the state had.  
Essentially, the Realism lens explains that states make the decisions they do in 
order to further their own interests because “it argues that the national realist 
appropriation of this concept leads to an inconsistency in implementation that discredits 
its humanitarian objectives and foreshadows its delegitimization by states’ (Doukakis, 
2018).  This problem occurs due to a series of factors which are fourfold. First, 
international institutionalism underscores the R2P doctrine. Second, it is legally 
ambiguous which lends itself to become susceptible to selective, discretionary, and 
inconsistent use by the international community. Third, “it’s subjugation to the national 
interests of states as expressed through their foreign policy choices” (Doukakis, 2018). 
And finally, its interpretation as a tool potentially harbors the right to upset the relative 
security and stability of the international system.  
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1.3 The intersection of Realism and Constructivism 
 
Realism and Constructivism are often portrayed as incompatible approaches 
within International Relations Theory. However, there are often points of convergence 
and it is within this intersection where both the desire to seek out power and resources 
and the desire to uphold norms and values explains states’ behavior. This intersection 
provides the theoretical framework from which these cases will be analyzed. From the 
foundation of the Realism theory, anarchy will not be considered for the framework. 
Anarchy is the absence of authority, that society is self-governed without anyone or 
anything to hold societies accountable for their actions. Instead, through the actions of 
the UNSC and the voting record of the members of the UN, cooperation does occur, 
this aspect is a key part of the Liberal Realist foundation, they believe that there is a 
society of states that allows for stability, in this case, the consideration that the UN can 
and does play a role, helps shape state’s behavior. The vote to deploy peacekeepers 
under the mandate into Côte d’Ivoire, the vote to intervene in Libya, the vote to create a 
panel of Experts to analyze the situation in Yemen for human rights violations, and the 
numerous resolutions passed condemning the situation all demonstrate the ability of the 
UN to cooperate.  
The framework acknowledges and accepts that the state is the central actor, that 
they are rational, and their actions are a reflection of their self-interest, and that all 
states desire power to ensure self-preservation, but also that states build up their 
economies and military capabilities in order to ensure security, which is a critical aspect 
of the Neorealist lens. The foundation of Constructivism that international relations is 
socially and historically constructed will also be considered to be a part of this 
framework because states have demonstrated in the past through the formation of 
alliances, foreign policies based on identity and values, and the acceptance of human 
nature to be inherent in the decision-making process. When states are involved in 
humanitarian intervention, the decision to intervene could be as simple as protecting 
people from an oppressive leader and liberating the people. The decision could be 
explained from a social norm perspective because it is generally more widely accepted 
to intervene on behalf of someone else However, if that were to hold true in all 
situations there would be consistency in situations that the international community gets 
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involved in. As that consistency does not exist, it demonstrates that states are choosing 
which situations to intervene in and this reflects that their national interests, security 
desires, and human nature dictate their behavior instead of purely social norms.  
 Realism helps us explain states’ behavior within the scope of R2P because it 
incorporates the role geopolitical and economic interests have in their decision on 
whether or not to intervene. The implementation of R2P under the realist lens only 
happens selectively when it favors states’ interest. When utilizing R2P also is in the 
pursuit of material gains and solidifying relationships and securing access an economic 
relationship. As R2P contains intervention within the scope of the principle, it can also 
be used in a coercive manner to obtain material resources necessary for state security.  
Constructivism can help explain states’ behavior within the scope of R2P 
because it incorporates the aspect of intervention for a social responsibility to protect 
those in danger. The value of social interactions between states and the relationship 
upon which their alliance is formed, is integral to the theory. States align themselves 
with others who share the same norms and values. And state behavior is ultimately 
guided by the norms within the international system, so their actions are a reflection of 
what they hold to be important.  
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Chapter 2: The Foundation of R2P and Literature Review 
 
To better understand the implementation of R2P the historical evolution will be 
presented. The multidimensional and nuanced concept of R2P was created in the wake 
of the Rwandan Genocide and the Srebrenica Massacre in the 1990s as a step above the 
older, one-dimensional military concept of humanitarian intervention. The concept has 
evolved since its original inception in the ICISS report in 2001 and finally codified in 
the UN World Summit Outcome Document in 2005 which laid bare the four mass 
atrocity crimes that merit intervention. During the Yugoslav war, the presence of UN 
peacekeeping forces did little to help save people from becoming victim to extreme 
violence. The UN did authorize the use of force within a protective mandate, but with 
the inquiry issued 1999 it became clear these authorizations were issued too late. The 
reasoning the UN gave for failing to protect innocent civilians included concerns about 
capacity of and safety for the peacekeeping forces within the country, lack of military 
preparedness for the combat role, the reluctance of the international community to put 
their own citizens at risk, administrative delay and a commitment to the UN’s value of 
impartiality and non-use of force. The Security Council does experience political and 
legal gridlock over authorization of use of force. In 2000, the Millennium Report, 
Secretary-General Annan challenged the international community to create legislation 
which would allow states to step up and take primary responsibility. The report 
underlined the responsibility of the sovereign nation to protect their own citizens from 
avoidable catastrophe, mass murder, large-scale loss of life, rape and starvation. It also 
addressed the dilemma of intervention and the concerns that it could become a cover for 
“gratuitous interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states” (Annan, 2000, p. 47).  
He pointed out that the UN Charter was not meant as “a license for governments to 
trample on human rights and human dignity” (Annan, 1998) and that the UN as an 
organization is dedicated to the maintenance of international peace and security. He was 
not advocating for a blanket allowance, but rather a list of certain criteria that if met 
would justify intervention and the world would not see another Rwandan genocide or 
Srebrenica massacre.  
The R2P principle is established upon the norm that each state is responsible for 
the protection of their citizens and that their citizens hold certain individual rights that 
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cannot be denied to them. This norm was developed in the shadow of the treaty of 
Westphalia when responsibility of the population was shifted with the newly formed 
idea of sovereignty. But the incorporation of the true meaning of responsibility was not 
widely acknowledged until the development of R2P.  The approach for creating the 
principle was crafted around a three-pillar system of implementation. The first pillar 
was centered around the domestic responsibility of the state to protect their own 
civilians from four specific atrocity crimes: genocide, war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and ethnic cleansing. The second pillar focused on the responsibility of the 
international community to respond and provide assistance, develop state capacity to 
protect populations from atrocity crimes. The third pillar of the principle focused on the 
international community’s response to these atrocities should the state be unable or 
unwilling to protect its population. Essentially, the process is first prevention then 
protection if prevention was not enough. What R2P covers is narrow, but it is deep 
because of the limitless possibilities that can be taken in response to these atrocity 
crimes (Thakur, 2011).  In the 2005 World Summit Outcome the UN pledged to enforce 
the use of the R2P principle when a state is unable to fulfill its responsibility and the 
response would be proportionate. However, within this document the UN clarified that 
acting on behalf of the international community meant that they had the responsibility 
to use appropriate peaceful, diplomatic, and humanitarian means in accordance with 
Chapters VI and VIII of the UN Charter to protect people (138 and 139, UN General 
Assembly, 2005) and would first employ more diplomatic measures before resorting to 
the use of violence.  
International law contains contradictory elements, but it is overwhelmingly 
protective of the domestic jurisdiction of states. Within the UN Charter, Article 2, 
Paragraph 7 it specifically says that “nothing contained in the present Charter shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state” however there is an exception, within Chapter VII, 
Article 39 in which the “Security Council “shall determine the existence of any threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression” and thus, “decide what measures 
shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international 
peace and security.” Article 41 refers to the use of armed force and may call upon 
members of the UN. Article 42 refers to the extension of measures provided within the 
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previous article and allows for more extreme measures to be taken if necessary, to 
maintain and restore international peace and security. The crimes for which R2P can be 
invoked are illegal under international law, but there does continue to be dispute 
whether they can be enforced internationally. In international politics, when a state fails 
to protect basic rights such as freedom from arbitrary killing, freedom from torture, 
and/or rights to food and shelter, they forfeit their right not to be subject to intervention. 
All states have a duty to protect and intervene, “if an intervention is necessary, to 
provide subsistence needs held by all human beings” (Doyle, 2011, p. 78). Both the 
intervention should be considered within the standard of proportionality and states 
should never act on matters that would result in more loss than gain or cause more harm 
than it saves. 
The UNSC has reaffirmed the R2P principle in several resolutions Resolution 
1674 (2006) reaffirmed the resolution to protect civilians in armed conflicts, especially 
children and women, as well as the promotion of peace and security. Resolution 1894 
(2009) reiterated the importance of paragraphs 138 and 129 in the World Summit 
Outcome document in 2005 which outlined the four atrocity crimes the UN vowed to 
protect against. The R2P principle emerged from the “tempestuous international 
experience with atrocity crimes” (Doukakis, 2018) in the 1990s, however, the platform 
on which the principle is established upon is inconsistent and selectively implemented 
because of the legally ambiguous nature. R2P is nonbinding and political in character 
and because of its vague nature and scope it does not possess the status of a legal 
obligation. The UN High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change referred to 
R2P as an ‘emergent norm’ in which there is a shared responsibility on international 
security, but scholars disagree that R2P is a ‘norm’ because it lacks the legal elements 
required to recognize an ‘emergent norm’ (Secretary-General, 2004). R2P attempts to 
strike a balance “between unilateral interference and institutionalized indifference” 
(Thakur, 2011, p. 17). The goal is to help prepare the world, normatively, 
organizationally, and operationally to meet the continued challenges of intervention, 
whenever and wherever it occurs. To those who are participating in the intervention, 
international legitimacy is offered, as well as compliance and reduced transaction costs 
to hopefully achieve effective results. To those who are in need of the intervention, 
willfully or not, R2P offers the “reassurance of a rules-based system” (Thakur, 2011, p. 
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17). This structure provides instruction on the utilization of R2P and what to expect 
with its implementation.  
The Security Council was originally intended to guard the peace and stability of 
the post-war community and protect the weak and vulnerable. The Security Council that 
exists today fails to uphold the values and norms as stated within the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of 
the Crime of Genocide as adopted in 1948. The Security Council is obligated to uphold 
the protection of these enshrined rights and the failure to do so demonstrates an 
inability to uphold the original intent of the council (Adams, 2012). There have been 
accusations surrounding perceived selectivity in the decisions made on intervention 
about the Permanent Five (P5). There have been accusations that there has been 
selectivity in decisions about intervention due to the preoccupations of the P5. It has 
been proven throughout time that it can be difficult to make decisions within the 
Security Council with the fifteen members currently, five of which hold veto powers. 
“The major obstacle in getting quick, efficient action in Bosnia and Rwanda was not the 
lack of capacity of the Security Council to make decisions, but rather a lack of 
willingness of states (including members of the Council) to implement such decisions 
as were reached which lagged the response time (Roberts, 2003, p. 91).  
Since the inception of R2P in the early 2000s, there has been a lot written on the 
subject. From the general definition of the principle to specific instances in which R2P 
was applicable there are both staunch supporters and harsh critics.  It is widely accepted 
within the international community that humanitarian crises warrant the utilization of 
the R2P principle, but it is difficult to incentivize those with the power to invoke the 
principle. In the years since its creation there have been crises all over the world, but 
only a handful of them have seen the international community respond with the 
appropriate action. Specifically, there has been research published on certain conflicts 
and the resulting response, but it is uncommon to find anything written comparing 
several similar cases such as this paper. This thesis seeks to fill the gaps in the existing 
literature with a comparative case study done on the conflict situations in Libya, Côte 
d’Ivoire, and Yemen and highlight the similarities and differences within both the 
conflict and in the resulting response.   
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R2P is a global political commitment to address four major issues: genocide, 
war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes against humanity. These are founded upon the 
claim that sovereignty extends to protecting population from the previously listed 
crimes and violations of human rights. Originally sovereignty was viewed to be sacred, 
something that once violated constituted a breach in the international order. Since its 
inception with the Treaty of Westphalia, the way sovereignty was regarded did not 
change until the creation of R2P because it allowed the international community to 
view sovereignty as less than absolute. In the years before the principle was created, the 
international community saw two world wars, a prolonged Cold War with multiple 
proxy wars, and the “bloody cocktail of state collapse and warlordism” (Bellamy, 2006, 
p. 1) within sub-Saharan Africa. In part due to the efforts of the UN, regional 
organizations, and NGOs, there are fewer wars and acts of genocide in the past twenty 
years than there were between 1950 and 2000. But the issue remains at large with 
countries experiencing humankind’s capacity for “acts of shocking inhumanity” 
(Bellamy, 2009, p. 1). Unfortunately, the international community’s response to these 
acts of genocide and mass atrocities is often times slow, timid, and disorganized. 
Sometimes it is because states simply lack the political power and will to step in and 
end the violence. Sometimes states hold their own interests to be more important than 
that of the victims involved. Other times, there is political gridlock, such as in Kosovo 
in 1999 where there were states who wanted to intervene and there were states who 
opposed intervention on both political and legal grounds. More and more frequently 
world leaders declare an interest in the situation and indicate desire to intervene, but 
then find it difficult to muster up a response more deliberate than expressing “tepid 
political responses and weakly mandated and equipped peace operations” (Bellamy, 
2009, p. 2). In a lot of these cases, it is the combination of slow response, lack of will 
and political decisiveness that contributes to slow and under-resourced responses which 
leaves civilians in dangerous situations with little to no hope of resolution.  
There are issues within R2P advocacy. First, it is difficult to discern measures 
which are directed specifically at the crimes that fall within R2P and conflict prevention 
or within measures indirectly related to violence. Second, the absence of discernible 
limits allows room for a limited response because of the flexibility it allows states in 
their intervention. Third, the state on the receiving end might feel their sovereignty is 
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being violated beyond what is necessary to protect. And fourth, there is a turf issue on 
which agencies should take control over the intervention. The ICISS report in 2001 
originally attempted to be explicit when they set out the four areas of responsibility: 
political, economic, legal, and military, but the report did not explain what it was the 
governments had a responsibility to prevent and protect. The initial concept of 
redefining sovereignty was explicit within the application of the principle in situations 
where the government was neither willing nor able to cope with the situation, both 
purposeful and accidental catastrophes. The ‘just cause’ principle was only focused on 
large-scale loss of life and ethnic cleansing. Within the report, there are gaps that allow 
for not only misinterpretation, but also selective implementation. The UNSC is the only 
authority who can employ the use of force as outlined within the R2P framework and is 
widely considered a measure of last resort as the UN generally attempts to avoid the 
deployment of military forces. Beginning in 2009, the UN Secretary-General has since 
published annual reports on R2P and these have included measures to prevent atrocity 
crimes, aimed at governments, intergovernmental organizations, NGOs, civil society 
and the private sector. R2P has also been a subject of considerable debate regarding its 
implementation in various situations, such as Libya or Côte d’Ivoire.  
Generally regarded as the same concept, humanitarian intervention and R2P are 
similar in their practice and scope but have four major differences that separate them. 
First, humanitarian intervention only refers to the use of military while R2P is a two-
fold principle: prevention then intervention. If it is not possible to prevent the initial 
causes of genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against humanity, then the 
use of force is considered to be a last report measure when all other attempts have failed 
and it can only be authorized by the Security Council. Humanitarian intervention allows 
for the use of force as a humanitarian imperative without explicit authorization from the 
UNSC or any other supra-national organization. Second, R2P is imbedded in the 
existing international laws related to sovereignty, peace and security, human rights, and 
armed conflict. Third, the scope of R2P is much narrower than the scope of 
humanitarian intervention and only allows for intervention within the four mass atrocity 
crimes. While ethnic cleansing is not necessarily a crime as defined under international 
law, the UN has defined the act as “a purposeful policy designed by one ethnic or 
religious group to remove by violent and terror-inspiring means the civilian population 
 29 
of another ethnic of religious group” (Paragraph 130, UN Expert Report, 1994) which 
“breeds intolerance and suspicion of other ethnic and religious groups and is conducive 
to violence when it is politically manipulated” (Paragraph 131). The initial definition of 
ethnic cleansing came in the wake of the events perpetrated by the Serbians in Bosnia in 
1994. The fourth and final difference is rooted in the wording of the principle. 
Humanitarian intervention assumes the right to intervene in which it can “proceed 
without the need to secure appropriate authorization under international law” (Adams, 
2012, p. 11). R2P is literally rooted in the ‘responsibility to protect’ and does not deal 
with the semantics of motivation.  
Even though R2P is rooted in the attempt to protect the innocent, sometimes it is 
difficult to stop the event before it happens. Oftentimes, genocide is not recognized as 
such until it is already or almost too late. Also, R2P does not offer clear criteria for 
what constitutes serious harm to justify military action. The intentions behind the 
creation of R2P were noble, but in practice the principle has too many generalizations 
which allow room for interpretation beyond its original intention. As it has unclear 
criteria for justification for military action, in practice that sets the bar for intervention 
very low which allows for justifying a violation of state sovereignty by the real or 
perceived threat of violence. There is lack of a clear standard for the level of mass 
atrocities necessary to justify military intervention. The threshold criteria utilize 
demonstrative language such as “large-scale loss of life” which no attempt to quantify 
large-scale and instead evokes an emotional response that may not be grounded in 
legality or practicality. Also, the extensive international protection the report seeks to 
provide is offered over a “broad continuum of circumstances of anarchy and tyranny 
beyond safeguarding people in imminent danger” (Pape, 2012, p. 51). R2P does not 
offer any moral guidance for how states should approach the potential causalities of 
their own during an intervention. It obligates the international community to engage in 
nation-building after the intervention is over as it mandates the UN would need to take 
control of the state. During the rebuilding process the UN would need to establish and 
support new institutions such as political, social, and economic entities that would 
allow for the establishment of democratic process regardless of the original political 
regime that was ruling the country. This requires the international community to 
maintain a presence in the country long after the conflict has ended, whether or not they 
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agree to it. In theory R2P means well, but in practice the lack of clarity on “the central 
issues of degree of harm, acceptable costs, and lasting security, the international 
community is unlikely to embrace the R2P movement” (Pape, 2012, p. 52).  
Originally with the ICISS Report in 2001, the scope of the principle was 
intended to include “chronic insecurities of hunger, disease, inadequate shelter, crime, 
unemployment, social conflict, and environmental hazard” (Chapter 2, Article 23) and 
“overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is 
either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is 
occurring or threatened” (Chapter 4, Article 20). However, with the UN World Summit 
Outcome Document in 2005, it was decided that only the four mass atrocity crimes 
would be applicable for R2P. It is natural that the responsibility to protect could be 
extended to include protection from natural disasters and environmental catastrophes. It 
could be further extended to include protection from proliferation of nuclear weapons, 
weapons of mass destruction, the use of land mines and cluster bombs. It is much more 
appropriate to use a concept like “human security than to say these are proper 
applications of the new international norm of the ‘responsibility to protect’” (Evans, 
2009). The whole point of embracing the language of R2P as outlined in the UN World 
Summit Outcome Document in 2005 is “that it is capable of generating an effective, 
consensual response to extreme, conscience-shocking cases in a way that ‘right to 
intervene’ language simply could not” (Evans, 2009). And if the language is extended 
to include everything it becomes about protecting everyone from everything which will 
end up protecting “nobody from anything” (Evans, 2009). A further problem in 
extending the language of the R2P principle to include the whole human security 
agenda is that it “immediately raises the hackles of those who see it as the thin end of a 
totally interventionist wedge” (Evans, 2009).  
Given all this, it is easy to understand why “many governments continue to 
suspect that R2P is simple a ‘Trojan horse’ for the legitimization of unilateral 
intervention” (Bellamy, 2008, p. 617). However, on the other side of the argument, 
staunch R2P supporters argue that the 2005 definition was inadequate as it did not 
provide clear guidance about the circumstances in which military intervention could be 
justified or what should happen in a situation of decision-making gridlock within the 
UNSC. There is a problem with the use of force in R2P situations because often times it 
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underscores the seriousness of the other free commitments and sometimes “there is 
something inherently militaristic about R2P that diverts attention away from non-
military solutions” (Bellamy, 2008, p. 634). Furthermore, improving the capacity of the 
UN and regional organizations to provide early warning of genocide and mass atrocities 
would help round out the operationalization of the three commitments. In avoiding 
overuse of military-led interventions there is another humanitarian protection mandate 
that the UN has established. The Protection of Civilians (PoC) mandate shares the same 
humanitarian foundation as R2P but differs in scope and applicability. The mandate can 
be implemented in times in which there is a need to protect civilians, but the need is not 
as urgent as that in which R2P should be utilized. It is important to know the 
differences between the two because of the selectivity in their application.  
The need to protect civilians and non-combatants in armed conflicts has been 
codified in the 1949 Fourth Geneva Convention ‘Relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Times of War’ but carved a clear niche for the concept in times of armed 
conflict (Geneva Convention (IV) 21949). Within the PoC mandate not all war crimes 
are applicable because they are not committed against civilians, but all war crimes fall 
under R2P as they are one of the four mass atrocity crimes outlined in the 2005 UN 
World Summit Outcome Document. The first Resolution passed in Libya (1970) fell 
under the technicality of R2P because it did involve atrocities against peaceful 
demonstrators, but it was not technically an armed conflict yet. With Resolution 1973 
PoC could be invoked as the conflict in Libya became classified as a civil war and no 
longer protests or riots. It becomes an obligation of all parties involved in the conflict to 
protect civilians, which in the case of Libya, was the pro-Gaddafi forces and anti-
Gaddafi forces. R2P in this case was a matter for states only, “PoC can be an obligation 
for non-state actors” (Popovski, 2011, p. 5).  
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Chapter 3: Conceptualizing and Operationalizing the Variables 
 
The theoretical lenses tell us that in Realism power and resources determine 
states behavior Power and resources can be represented as economic interests and 
geopolitical interests. Constructivism tell us that identity, norms and values determine 
state behavior. These factors can be represented by social interests. Economic interest 
will be defined using the trade relationship between Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Yemen 
and both the EU and P5 members on the Security Council. The EU will be included in 
this because the U.K. and France are major leaders within the EU and will make 
decisions not only based on their national interest, but also the interests of the EU. 
Social interests will be defined as the norms and values as established within the UN 
Charter that members of the UN agreed to uphold and protect. Geopolitical interests 
will be defined using the established economic and political ties to explain the 
relationship between the EU, members of the Security Council, and the three countries.  
 
3.1 Economic Interest 
 
 In order to demonstrate the presence of economic interest within the case 
countries the economic relationship of exports and imports to and from each country 
will be analyzed. The presence of economic interest will be assessed whether or not it 
exists, to what extent it exists, and then compared against the other countries to 
illustrate how strong the relationships are in relation to one another. A significant 
economic relationship is one that has deep economic ties in addition to a political 
relationship that allows for trade and investment flows, job innovation and mutually 
beneficial economic growth with the gradual reduction of trade barriers (Ahearn, 2012). 
Policies are concerned with the international economic relationship that mutually 
benefit both trading partners. One of the benefits of an economic relationship is the 
political and security benefits it brings because of the mutually beneficial relationship 
on the respective economy. Within the Realist lens, building economic power is an 
aspect that drives states’ behavior because it allows for continued access to resources 
which ensures security.  
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Looking back at the Cold War, communication between the U.S. and the USSR 
was very limited and Henry Kissinger argued that improved economic relations might 
mitigate the tension. Along with security and political considerations, economic 
interdependence could be considered a factor in foreign policy behavior. However, it is 
also important to recognize that trade relationships can be one sided and thus have 
aspects of vulnerability. There can be economic interest in another state without there 
being a reciprocal relationship. Therefore, state A may be interested in state B’s 
developments based on its economic interest. Similarly, it may not be interested 
because it is only state B that has economic interest in state A. To measure the 
economic relationship between the case study countries and the major players in world 
politics this research will use the database provided by the Observatory of Economic 
Complexity (OEC) and Eurostat, a database provided by the European Commission for 
statistics on the products and services that are traded. These are both well-established 
sources that provides the study reliability. Using this data will demonstrate the 
economic relationships that exist between the case study states and the major world 
powers. From this information the importance given to the economic repercussions of 
(non)intervention can be observed and help explain state behavior. Data was gathered 
regarding trade flows of goods and services in the five years preceding the outbreak of 
the conflict. It becomes possible to view economic growth and development in relation 
to the central role it plays in developing a country’s economy and interprets the network 
through which countries are connected by products they export and import.  
Libya’s economy is almost entirely dependent on oil and gas exports. Since 
2011, it has struggled given the security and political instability and disruptions in oil 
production, coupled with a decline in oil prices worldwide. Their main exports include 
crude oil, refined petroleum products, natural gas, and chemicals. Their main imports 
include machinery, semi-finished goods, food, transportation equipment, and consumer 
products (The World Factbook, 2019). In regard to the EU, Libya is the only 
Mediterranean country, apart from Syria, that has not yet concluded a Free Trade 
Agreement. Nor is Libya a WTO member. The accession negotiations began in 2004 
and the negotiations for a Free Trade Agreement began in 2008, but all negotiations 
were suspended following the events in February 2011. As Libya is still embroiled in an 
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internal political conflict, negotiations have stalled and will not begin again until the 
EU assess the situation and deems it stable enough to continue negotiating.  
Until Côte d’Ivoire completes the full adoption of the regional ‘stepping stone’ 
Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) with the EU, they will remain in the 
provisional application state. The stepping stone agreement lays out the framework for 
the establishment of the Economic Partnership and its objectives are fivefold. First, it 
allows for enhanced market access offered by the European Commission to avoid trade 
disruptions. Second, it lays the foundation to help reduce poverty, promote regional 
integration and economic cooperation and good governance. Also, with the goal to 
improve West Africa’s capacities in regard to commercial policy and trade-related 
issues. Third, to promote the “harmonious and progressive integration of West Africa 
into the world economy” (Article 2, (c)) in accordance with political and developmental 
priorities. Fourth, to strengthen the existing relationship between the EU and Côte 
d’Ivoire on the basis of solidarity and mutual interest. And finally, to create an 
agreement that is compatible with the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trades 
(GATT) 1994 as established in the WTO. The main exports of the country are cocoa, 
coffee, timber, petroleum, cotton, bananas, pineapples, palm oil, and fish (The World 
Factbook, 2019). Their main imports are fuel, capital equipment and raw food material. 
Following the collapse of the economy in 2011 the country has slowly started to 
improve and return to peace and stability (Société Générale, 2019). 
Yemen is one of the poorest countries in the Arab region and its economy is 
heavily reliant on oil production and exporting. Yemen exports crude oil which 
accounts for about 90% of its total exports Non-oil goods are primarily agricultural 
products such as fish, vegetables, fruit, coffee and honey. In the years since the 
unification of the country Yemen has seen a forced return of 1 million Yemeni workers 
from Saudi Arabia in 1990-1991, a 1994 Civil War which drained their economy thus 
forcing them to rely heavily on economic aid. Their economy was weakened before the 
violence started in 2011 and further deteriorated in 2014 when the Houthi rebels started 
yet another Civil War. Oil export had been declining due to depleting resources. Prior 
to the conflict the EU had been a key player in Yemen’s economic development by 
providing inter alia direct assistance to help Yemen’s accession process to the WTO 
and integration into the world economy. Most of the labor force in Yemen is employed 
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in agricultural or herding. As of 2014, unemployment was estimated to be 37% and 
with the closure of many civil society sectors it can be expected that it was grown. In 
years since the outbreak of war it is estimated that 80% of the Yemeni population now 
lives below the poverty line and the Yemeni riyal has experienced inflation and a 
devaluation (Save the Children, 2018).  
 
 3.2 Social Interest 
 
 In order to establish the presence of social interest in the cases, there will be 
several factors proposed as a measurement tool. The UN Charter explains what it seeks 
to protect and what powers it has to uphold the principles, “to take collective measures 
for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and security, and for the 
suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace” (Article 1(1)) and 
settle international disputes or situations that might lead to a breach of the peace. One 
of the purposes of the UN is to develop and foster friendly relations among nations 
which is rooted in the respect for the principle of equal rights. The goal of “achieving 
international co-operation in solving international problems of an economic, social, 
cultural, or humanitarian character” (Article 1(3)) and to be the center of harmonizing 
action for member nations in the ultimate achievement of these purposes. By signing 
the UN Charter, the P5 agree to uphold the values as outlined within the charter. They 
stand to be the peacemaker in settling disputes and uphold the human rights and values 
that are most important. International Human Rights Law lays down the obligations of 
the sovereign governments that through their actions they promote and protect human 
rights and the fundamental freedoms of individuals or groups. The foundations for this 
body of law come from the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
and Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. These 
three documents outline the most important human rights and freedoms that everyone 
should have, regardless of their situation and from these, UN Resolutions are passed 
with criteria on how to deal with the conflicts and the perpetrators. These are the 
fundamentals from which social interests are formed. Within the Constructivist lens, 
these norms and values that the UN seeks to uphold are what dictates states’ behavior 
and the act on behalf of morals.  
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 The first factor to establish social interest is the amount of people within the 
country lacking access to basic sanitation. The second factor is the amount of people 
facing food insecurity, not knowing if there will be a next meal. The third, the number 
of civilian casualties will be analyzed. This is not to compare them in terms of which 
conflict saw more deaths but to understand where and in what manner they occurred. 
Each conflict is similar enough that there will be parallels, but also different enough 
that each conflict is unique in their root causes. Fourth, internally displaced persons and 
fifth, the total amount of people within the country in need of humanitarian assistance. 
The total population of each country will be considered to put into context the amounts 
of the population facing the factors listed above. These numbers will be compared, not 
for their severity, but to establish that there are civilians experiencing violations of their 
humanitarian rights and freedoms as enshrined to them by the UN Charter.   
 
3.3 Geopolitical Interest 
 
 Before establishing the presence of geopolitical interest, it is important to 
understand what exactly that means. Grounded in the literal meaning of the word, 
geopolitics is the study of the effects of the world on politics and international relations 
and “great power competition over access to strategic locations and natural resources” 
(Overland, 2015, p. 1). Geography is considered the study of natural phenomena such 
as climate, topography and resources. Ambitiously, social organizations dependent on 
such natural phenomena could be included as well. Within these organizations the 
social practices, customs, and methods of securing a livelihood will include an 
economy and “the step from economic and social geography to political geography is a 
short one, for political institutions and practices comprise a large part of social and 
economic organizations” (Hagan, 1942, p. 478). The core of political geography is the 
state and the state cannot exist without territory or space. A growing state will expand, 
and this expansion could include emigration, trading centers, cultural centers, or even 
war. The subsequent revisions of ‘geopolitics’ included “being concerned with territory, 
people, management for promoting national welfare, social organization, and 
governmental structure” (Hagan, 1942, p. 482). There is little distinction between 
political geography and geopolitics, but at the root of it, geopolitics “observes and 
speculates upon the influence of geographical necessities upon political events and 
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changes in the political forms of states” (Hagan, 1942, p. 484).  Geopolitics is the 
theory of political events that are integrated into their geographical setting and the 
results that come from this integration. There are many types of geopolitical interests 
such as oil and petroleum resources. “The high pace of extraction and consumption of 
oil and gas, driven by population growth and accelerated by economic growth in 
emerging economies” (Overland, 2015, p. 2) is ultimately leading to the depletion of oil 
resources worldwide which drives the need to securing oil resources. There are several 
geopolitical factors that will be analyzed in order to establish geopolitical interest and to 
what extent the interest holds importance. Natural resource security, regional stability 
and state relations will also be considered in ascertaining the presence of geopolitical 
interest. Analyzing the situation will establish the presence of geopolitical interest and 
the absence of stands for itself.  
The definition of geopolitics that this research will be utilizing is the “influence 
of physical geographical factors on interstate relations” (Agnew, 2000, p. 92) which 
aims to understand the important role geography plays in global political relations with 
special concern to what aspects of geography are most important. According to Buzan 
and Wæver, geographical limitations change the security power dynamic, and this has 
an impact on the political decision-making process. Prominent questions concern 
themselves with “how implicit geographical assumptions about state territories in 
global geopolitics affect both political theory and practice” (Agnew, 2000, p. 93); or 
how the relative location of states, resources, military and security vulnerabilities, alter 
the political considerations. Geopolitics does not simply ‘happen’. It is “practiced by 
agents at discrete sites of knowledge production, from where it is disseminated and 
enforced” (Agnew, 2000, p. 98). Geopolitics extends to spheres of influence and 
hegemonic spatial control which goes to help explain certain behavior (e.g. self-
preservation, enhancing international standings, expanding the sphere of influence) 
exhibited by states and identify the reasons behind such actions (Morozova, 2009). The 
subject matter of geopolitics includes taking into consideration population problems, 
frictional issues between states, colonization instincts from people which can stem from 
race, nationalism, and almost any other driving form of state expansion. These factors 
play a role in the decision to intervene.  
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Through the lens of Realism, the drive to secure power and resources can be 
seen as a way of securitizing the state. Taking economic interest into consideration, 
strengthening the economy can be seen as a way of securing future resources and power 
avenues because of the possibility that others will rely on that state for financial 
reasons. By examining the trade relationship of each country with the P5 and the EU a 
material measurement will be established through which the cases will be compared 
and contrasted. Social interests are more important for traditional Constructivists when 
analyzing a conflict on behalf of taking action. but is something that Liberal Realists 
consider a part of their sub-theory. However, the UN established certain social interests, 
such as the preservation of peace and security, are an important part of the 
responsibilities of the international community. Then, the potential intervening states 
will take into consideration the geopolitical interests or lack thereof in their decision to 
respond to humanitarian crises. The inclusion of interests within the decision to respond 




Chapter 4: Case Overview 
 
These three conflicts were selected because they are the embodiment of the 
situations that R2P strives to prevent. In the case of Libya, it is the only conflict to this 
day that has had the utilization of the R2P principle as a justification for intervention. 
The conflict in Côte d’Ivoire was of similar magnitude and scale, occurring at almost 
the same time, yet did not get the same response, so it is used as a complementary 
conflict to compare against. The situation Yemen is an ongoing crisis that serves a 
current comparison in which the conflict is clearly a violation of the norms and values 
that R2P declares to protect. It is not just war, it is non-discriminatory acts of 
aggression, destruction of civil infrastructure, the threat of imminent death and 
starvation of millions of children that has been happening for several years now with no 
end in sight.  
To put the conflicts into context, it is important to understand the historical 
background. The creation of the R2P principle came as a result of the UN Charter that 
was created in the aftermath of WWII with the formation of the UN. The goal of the 
UN was to promote peace and stability with a respect for the importance of sovereignty, 
especially for the many newly formed independent nations or those seeking 
independence from colonizers (Bajoria and McMahon, 2013). This concept of 
sovereignty was new for many countries and their freedom would come with 
responsibility. In Article 2(7) of the Charter it explicitly states that nothing “shall 
authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the 
domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit to such 
matters” but that this principle “shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII” (UN Charter).Chapter VII refers to “Threats to the Peace, 
Breaches of Peace, and Acts of Aggression” (Articles 39-51, UN Charter) during which 
the UN explains the terms and conditions that might require members to act based on 
recommendations from the Security Council if they have deemed that there is a threat to 
the peace and then call upon parties to comply with provisional measures to protect the 
peace. However, in 1948, the newly written Convention on the Prevention and 
Punishment of Crimes of Genocide overrode the principle of non-intervention with 
Article VIII which outlines that the ‘contracting party’ may call upon the “competent 
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organs of the United Nations to take such action under the Charter of the United 
Nations as they consider appropriate for the prevention and suppression of acts of 
genocide or any of the other acts enumerated in article III” (UN General Assembly, 
1948).  
Yet the inaction to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide and the 1995 Srebrenica 
massacre in Bosnia highlighted the complexities in international responses to these 
crimes against humanity that the UN Charter pledged to protect against. Thus, heeding 
Secretary-General Annan’s call, the Canadian government along with a group of major 
foundations announced at the UN General Assembly in 2000 that they had established 
the ICISS. This commission was established upon the principle with state sovereignty 
comes state responsibility of its citizens but, when the state is no longer willing or able 
to protect its people, “the principle of non-intervention yields to the responsibility to 
protect” (ICISS Report, 2001). There are three core elements of R2P: the responsibility 
to prevent, the responsibility to react, and the responsibility to rebuild. The UNSC was 
tasked with the power to authorize military intervention for human protection purposes 
with a goal to allow the UNSC to become more productive and assertive of its 
authority. Consequently, Security Council authorization should be sought prior to any 
military intervention and in order to mobilize any military there must be explicit 
authorization or have the Secretary-General raise the issue under Article 99 of the UN 
Charter. It is implied that the Security Council should move these matters along in a 
timely manner.  
The ICISS outlines two alternatives if the Security Council were to reject a 
proposal or fail to respond in a reasonable amount of time. These two options are to 
have the General Assembly in Emergency Special Session consider the situation, under 
the “United for Peace Procedure” or act within the area of jurisdiction by the regional 
and sub-regional organizations as stipulated under Chapter VIII of the UN Charter 
(ICISS Report, 2001). In essence, the ICISS report was responding to the new types of 
challenges that faced the world in the late 20th and early 21st century. There have been 
significant changes since the UN was founded in 1945. New realities and new 
challenges emerged which required new expectations for action and new standards of 
conduct. New international institutions have been created to meet the new 
circumstances however, the mandates and capacity of these new institutions have not 
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been able to keep pace with international needs or modern expectations. Above all else, 
the issue of international intervention for the purpose of humanitarian protection is clear 
example of action needed to bring international norms and the international institutions 
in line with international needs and expectations (Article 1 (11)).  
Within the areas of human rights and human security there were several 
prominent and new institutional actors. Among them are the UN High Commissioner 
for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 
and the ICC. The ICC allows perpetrators to be brought to justice on an international 
scale. The universal jurisdiction established within the Geneva Convention, as well as 
the Convention Against Torture, allow any state involved in which a person stands 
accused of crimes listed within these conventions to bring that person to trial, 
“[u]niversal jurisdiction is also available under customary international law, and 
associated state legislation, for genocide and crimes against humanity” (Article 1 (26)). 
These changes in law and legal norms have been accompanied by the establishment of a 
wide range in new international institutions and non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) who are tasked with implementing these rights worldwide. The resulting effect 
is new expectations for conduct and new expectations for corrective action (Article 1 
(27)).  
To ground the situation in the context of the theoretical lens the background will 
be presented first. The economic relationship between each country, the P5, and the EU 
will be illustrated using the average trade flow of the 5 years before the conflict to. 
Also, with consideration to the conflict, the social situation and the geopolitical 
interests in relation to the states will be discussed. The economic relationship is an 
important aspect of the background to each conflict because it helps establish the 
strength of the relationship and the level of economic interest of each case. The social 
situation is key in understanding the conflict because of the violations of humanitarian 
law vary in each situation which could potentially alter the response from the 
international community. The foundation of geopolitical interests is essential to 
understanding the political situation and the resulting response because of the influence 




4.1 Libya Conflict Overview 
 
The First Libyan Civil War began on February 17, 2011. This armed conflict 
was centered around the forces loyal to President Muammar Gaddafi and those who 
wanted his government ousted from power. The protests that precipitated the Civil War 
were based on the public’s growing unrest over the delays in the building of housing 
units and political corruption. In mid-January 2011, protesters began clashing with 
police officers and started breaking into government buildings. The government 
initially responded with an investment fund to provide the housing and development 
projects with enough money to complete what they had initially pledged to finish. By 
the end of January, Jamal al-Hajji, a writer and political commentator, was arrested by 
plain-clothes officers after they alleged that he hit someone with his car, which he 
denied. In reality, al-Hajji was arrested because he had called on Libyans to peacefully 
protest for greater freedom within the country, inspired by the events in Tunisia and 
Egypt. al-Hajji had written a series of articles about the political development and 
human rights situation in Libya and had been previously arrested and detained because 
of purported contempt of judicial authorities and dissent which under Law 75 
established in 1974 is illegal.  
In early February 2011, President Gaddafi met with political activists, 
journalists and media figures and warned them that they would be held responsible if 
they continued to disturb the peace or fostered chaos in Libya. The failure to protect 
journalists and media workers was exacerbated by the outbreak in violence because of 
Law 71 established in 1972 which allows the government to keep a tight lid on freedom 
of expression and allows the criminalization of assembly based on political ideology. 
So, anyone caught speaking out against the government or President Gaddafi could find 
themselves in danger. This did not stop the protests and soon they would lead to a civil 
war, which was a part of the wider Arab Spring.  
The protestors soon organized a “Day of Rage” which called for all Libyans in 
country and in exile to protest on February 17, 2011 if they were opposed to the 
Gaddafi government. These plans were in part inspired by the protests in Tunisia and 
Egypt and also in memory of the demonstrations that happened in Benghazi five years 
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earlier. Libyan security forces took up arms and began firing into the crowd as 
protestors began raiding government building and police stations. Police and army 
personnel later withdrew from Benghazi after becoming vastly outnumbered by the 
protestors. Many of the Gaddafi opposers called for a return to the 1951 Constitution 
which allowed for a transition to a multi-party democracy and established that all 
Libyans were equal before the law and all shall enjoy civil and political rights (Article 
11), that “no one may be arrested, detained, imprisoned or searched except in the cases 
prescribed by the law” (Article 16), and that freedom of thought, press, and peaceful 
association are guaranteed (Articles 22, 23, 26). The National Transitional Council 
(NTC) was established on February 27, 2011 to consolidate change in the rule of Libya. 
Their main objective was to coordinate resistance between the areas of the country 
under rebel control and represent the opposition to the international community. They 
did not try to form an interim government because their goal was to have a political 
face for the revolution to help liberate Libya (Abdessadok, 2017). President Gaddafi 
began to threaten the Libyan population with mass murder, he “declared that he would 
show no mercy to his own people” (Harris, 2011). President Obama called on the 
International Community to step up and take action as he was afraid that waiting even a 
day would be too late and Benghazi would fall. This powerful and emotion evoking 
language that President Obama used in his speech is partly the reason the U.S. found 
itself embroiled in yet another conflict in the Muslim world. Critics of the President 
have accused him of not setting out “concrete objectives and failing to justify another 
military intervention in the Muslim world” (Harris, 2011). The NATO led mission in 
Libya evoked the core principles of the R2P doctrine that they were to intervene in 
Libya to protect the civilians caught up in the conflict between President Gaddafi and 
his supporters against the rebel fighters and innocent civilians.  
President Gaddafi claimed that the rebels were being influenced by Al-Qaeda 
and Osama bin Laden, and that the protesters were “fueled by milk and Nescafe spiked 
with hallucinogenic drugs” (Millership and Blair, 2011). He vowed publicly to squash 
the revolt and continue fighting to be the last one standing. He acknowledged that there 
was momentum growing from the protests in Tunisia and Egypt and that they could be 
influencing his own people, but did not accept that he could be causing the problems in 
his attempt to preserve his 41-year rule over the Libyan people. UN Secretary-General 
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Ban Ki-moon called on the Libyan president to respect human rights and international 
humanitarian law. When these requests fell on deaf ears, the Security Council 
demanded an end to the violence in Libya which they felt, amounted to crimes against 
humanity. The UNSC began taking action against Libya with the imposition of 
economic sanctions beginning on February 26, 2011 following UNSC Resolution 1970 
(Thakur, 2011).  
The U.K. and France took the lead attempting to mobilize diplomatic support 
for military action helping the Libyan rebels, but everything changed once the U.S. 
entered the conflict. On March 15, 2011, following President Obama’s speech, the U.S. 
government’s top officials decided to take an interventionist approach in favor of 
dealing with the crisis in Libya to protect the innocents whose lives were at risk. The 
U.S. and Britain had deployed submarines and fired cruise missiles while the Royal 
Canadian Air Force, the French Air Force, the U.S. Air Force, and the British Royal Air 
Force undertook sorties across Libya backed by a naval blockade by the British Royal 
Navy. The U.S. initially held strategic command of the military intervention with a 
Joint Task Force Operation Odyssey Dawn. The goal of the operation was to protect 
civilians form attacks perpetrated by the pro-Gaddafi forces. Security Council 
Resolution 1973 was adopted on March 17, 2011 with a vote of 10-0-5 (abstentions by 
China, Russia, Brazil, Germany, and India). This resolution authorized the use of all 
measures necessary to protect civilians and civilian-populated areas. On March 30, 
2011 NATO assumed command of all aspects of the coalition’s military operations. 
Establishment of the no-fly zone over Libya proceeded smoothly (Gertler, 2011). 
Resolution 1970 and 1973 allowed a coalition to be mobilized which included a UN 
mandate to protect civilians, establish and enforce a no-fly zone, enforced an arms 
embargo, included an asset freeze and travel restriction on President Gaddafi and other 
Libyan government officials (Resolution 1970, 1973(2011)). 
 In May 2011, the Russian government officially recognized the NTC as the 
legitimate dialogue partner and in June 2011, the Chinese government sent negotiators 
from Beijing to begin discussion about the future relationship between the countries. 
Both countries had invested extensively in the country and wanted to continue a 
relationship. Concurrently to this acknowledgment of a new potential authority, 
President Gaddafi and his son, Saif al-Islam announced they would hold a new round of 
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elections that would have transparency guaranteed. If President Gaddafi won the 
election, he would regain control of the Libyan government and if he lost, he would 
cede power, but not go into exile (Carey, 2011).  The international community did not 
take kindly to this offer and reiterated that they would not accept anything less than 
President Gaddafi stepping down immediately. NATO rejected the offer and resumed 
bombardment of Tripoli. In July 2011, Saif al-Islam accused NATO of bombing 
innocent Libyan civilians under false pretenses and tried to offer NATO an alternative 
that they drop the referral of his father to the ICC because neither he nor his father 
ordered the killing of civilian protestors (Smith, 2011). He claimed that the civilians 
who died were killed while trying to take over a military site and alleged that any other 
country, such as the U.S. or Russia, or even Germany would act accordingly if their 
military sites were ambushed. The ICC issued arrest warrants for President Gaddafi, his 
son al-Islam and intelligence chief Abdullah al-Sanoussi on the grounds that they 
committed crimes against humanity while cracking down on the civilian uprisings. The 
ICC presiding judge, Sanji Mmasenono Monageg declared in the Pre-Trial Chamber I 
decision that there were reasonable grounds to believe that President Gaddafi and his 
son, al-Islam are “criminally responsible as indirect co-perpetrators of the crimes 
against humanity of murder and persecution based on political grounds” (Article IV 
(71)) committed in Libyan territory in February of 2011 and the arrest was necessary. 
 By August of 2011, the rebel fighters had gained control over parts of Tripoli 
although many neighborhoods remained under control of pro-Gaddafi fighters. 
Hospitals and clinics were overwhelmed with victims who had been injured in the 
constant fighting and the death toll was becoming harder to estimate. In September, 
both the Russian government and the Chinese government acknowledged that the NTC 
was the only legal regime in Libya. This acceptance of the NTC came as a shock to the 
pro-Gaddafi supporters as previously both countries held a strong relationship with the 
President. By mid-October 2011, the city of Sirte had largely been taken over by NTC 
forces and by the end of the month President Gaddafi had been killed in the city. Saif 
al-Islam was captured evading authorities in the southern desert in November 2011 and 
Libya began discussions with the ICC over how to deal with him and bring him to 
justice.   
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Table 1: Libyan Trade Flow 
 
 
Between 2006 and 2010, Libya relied heavily on the EU to import a substantial 
portion of their economy. Before the outbreak of violence in 2011, the EU accounted 
for almost 70% of Libya’s total trade (European Commission, 2019). Despite the 
decrease that happened once the conflict started, the EU remains a major trading partner 
with Libya and relies on the country for energy. The trade flows analyzed were the 
exports into Libya and from Libya from the major countries and the EU. The average of 
the five years preceding the conflict was taken to illustrate a deeper understanding of 
the economic relationship and economic trend. The violence that President Gaddafi was 
threatening establishes the presence of a social interest that the international community 
are obliged to uphold. The immediate action taken by the UNSC and the justification 
for humanitarian intervention helps illustrate the importance of stopping the Libyan 
conflict as a geopolitical interest, which supports the central hypothesis that states 
intervene when these interests converge.     
 
4.2 Côte d’Ivoire Conflict Overview 
 
 To better understand why the conflict began in the country, it is important to 
look at the history of the country. Cote d’Ivoire was a colony of France until the 1960s 
when they gained their independence and became an autonomous country. This newly 
formed country was experiencing what it meant to be a sovereign nation for the first 
time and the responsibilities that went along with sovereignty. In the years prior, the 
country had reached an agreement with France (the 1956 Overseas Reform Act (Loi 
Cadre)) which allowed the colony to centralize certain powers within the country and 
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away from Paris (Keese, 2003). In the next 40 years the country would see a 
consolidation of power which did not allow for political competition. In the late 1990s, 
there was a military coup with a subsequent presidential election in October 2000 which 
saw Lauren Gbagbo win the presidency. However, the election was filled with conflict 
and public unrest. Alassane Ouattara was disqualified by the Supreme Court because of 
his alleged Burkinabé nationality and non-citizens were not allowed to run for 
presidency. In 2002, there was an attempted coup d’état while President Gbagbo was 
visiting Italy and the former president Robert Guéï was alleged to be behind the 
attempted coup. In January of 2003, President Gbagbo and the rebel leaders behind the 
coup signed peace accords which created the ‘Government of National Unity’ and the 
French soldiers began to be phased out of the country. This unity government was 
unstable however, as the central issues that surrounded the first Ivorian Civil War just a 
few years prior. In November of 2004, the unity government collapsed, and President 
Gbagbo began ordering airstrikes against the rebels who had refused to disarm. During 
one of the airstrikes, French soldiers were hit, and nine soldiers lost their lives. They 
had been deployed to maintain a “Zone of Confidence”. The UNSC was attempting to 
keep the peace and allowed President Gbagbo’s term to be extended another year in an 
effort to allow both sides to disarm by 2006. That year, they allowed his term to be 
extended for yet another year. Eventually the presidential elections that were supposed 
to be held in 2006 were held in 2010 in which former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara 
announced his candidacy against incumbent President Laurent Gbagbo.  
 Following the Presidential election in November of 2010 Gbagbo refused to 
relinquish power to the internationally recognized winner, Alassane Ouattara, despite 
having clearly lost the election. The subsequent events precipitated the Second Ivorian 
Civil War. After the international community pledged their support to Alassane 
Ouattara, Gbagbo and his supporters began retaliating in a violent manner. Ivorian 
civilians and Western African people were indiscriminately targeted, especially if they 
were an Ouattara supporter. The crimes being committed fell under the crimes against 
humanity category as Gbagbo’s “security forces and allied militias engage in brutal 
killings, forced disappearances, politically motivated rape, indiscriminate shelling, and 
torture in an often-organized campaign of terror against real or perceived supports of 
Alassane Ouattara” (Dufka, 2011). The Security Council adopted Resolution 1975 
 48 
which recognized Ouattara as the winner and recognized his Presidency. However, 
there were already UN Peacekeepers in Abidjan and their mission in Côte d’Ivoire 
(UNOCI) had been taking a beating. Their base had been attacked with heavy 
machinery, the office had taken on sniper fire and 11 Peacekeepers had been shot. One 
of their most important missions was to protect the Golf hotel, where Ouattara and his 
government-in-waiting were hiding waiting for the violence to end. UNOCI had 
initially been assigned to Côte d’Ivoire by Resolution 1528 (2004) in 2004 with a 
mandate to monitor the ceasefire agreement of 2003, encourage a relationship “between 
the National Armed Forces of Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI) and the military elements of the 
Forces Nouvelles in order to promote, in coordination with the French forces” 
(Resolution 1528 (6)(b)). The President of the General Assembly addressed the 
President of the Security Council and said that the Côte d’Ivoire continues to pose a 
threat to the international peace and security of the region, so also included in the 
mandate was the goal of disarmament, reintegration and repatriation, support the 
implementation of the peace process, and assisting in the field of human rights 
(Resolution 1528 (2004)).  
 Following Resolution 1528, UN Peacekeepers remained in the region and were 
witness to the atrocities committed by President Gbagbo and Youth Minister and 
Militia leader Charles Blé Goudé. On February 25, 2011, Blé Goudé “called on ‘Real 
Ivorians’ to protect their neighborhoods and chase out foreigners” (Dufka, 2011). This 
was a thinly veiled threat against northern Ivorian ethnic groups that had shown support 
to Ouattara during the election and any immigrants from neighboring countries, as well 
as the UN-authorized peacekeepers and French troops who stood in their way. There 
was a deeply imbedded hatred of foreigners within the country that stemmed from the 
attempted separation of ‘Real Ivorians’ from others after their independence from 
France. It was a way for those in power to maintain their power by alienating different 
parties. Blé Goudé’s militia supporters heeded the call and victims began appearing 
soon after. By late March 2011, almost 700,000 Abidjan residents had been displaced 
within a period of time of about 4 weeks due to fighting and fear of reprisals from the 
government supporters. On March 19, 2011, a spokesperson for President Gbagbo 
called on the supporters to “neutralize all suspect presences, which has only intensified 
concern about attacks on civilians” (Dufka, 2011). As “incendiary threats pour in from 
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both sides” (Dufka, 2011) it became evident that the former rebels of Forces Nouvelles, 
a political coalition formed after the Ivorian Civil War in 2002, who were loosely allied 
with Ouattara, had reverted back to their old ways. Forces Nouvelles retaliated with 
reprisal killings against Gbagbo supporters which involved execution of pro-Gbagbo 
forces detained in areas of the financial capital, Abidjan, which were under Forces 
Nouvelles’ control. These events were not denounced by Ouattara’s prime minister, the 
former Forces Nouvelles commander, Guillaume Soro which only aided to the 
destruction and chaos of the country.  
 The violence continued to escalate and on March 17, 2011, there was a rocket 
attack on the pro-Ouattara neighborhood in Abidjan which killed about 100 people. The 
Deputy Head of the Human Rights Division of UNOCI, Guillaume Ngefa, expressed 
his concern over the systematic attacks on civilians could constitute as crimes against 
humanity (UN, 2011). The UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs 
Valerie Amos voiced series concerns over the “rapidly deteriorating humanitarian 
situation in Côte d’Ivoire, particularly over the past month” (UN, 2011). Under-
Secretary-General Amos also voiced concerns about the increasing targeting and 
harassment of immigrants from other West African countries, many of whom are 
fleeing the country in search of a safer place. There is on-going destruction of civilian 
property and obstruction of aid workers, such as the UNOCI. President Ouattara issued 
a statement on March 28, 2011 which said that, “all peaceful routes to lead Laurent 
Gbagbo to admit his defeat have been exhausted” (Mail & Guardian, 2011). UN 
Resolution 1975 was issued on March 30, 2011 and it urged all Ivorian parties to 
respect the will of the people, honor the election of Alassane Ouattara as the President 
of Côte d’Ivoire, and called upon the international community to use ‘all necessary 
measures’ to protect the civilians under attack.  
 On April 2, 2011 the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported 
that more than 800 civilians were killed in Duékoué. This western Ivorian city had been 
the main destination for those fleeing the violence in Abidjan. Neither side had claimed 
responsibility and within the UN there was a fear it was committed by pro-Ouattara 
forces (ICRC, 2011). Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon expressed his concern, but 
President Ouattara denied the attack came from his supporters. Duékoué was reportedly 
a hub for pro-Gbagbo militia and there had been skirmishes with pro-Ouattara 
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supporters before the elections even took place. The UN Peacekeeping Mission had 
been targeted several times throughout March and April as well as having several UN 
convoys attacked in which several peacekeepers were injured.  In mid-April the mission 
took on heavy fire and 170 civilian staff were evacuated. Their mission chief, Choi 
Yong-jin, warned the UN that they were reaching a breaking point. They fired back at 
Gbagbo forces and were successful in destroying the heavy weapons stored at four 
different locations (Choi in Smith, 2011). This produced mixed results as the UN 
cannot be seen backing Ouattara in this conflict. They are not there to choose sides in 
the conflict, but there to protect innocent civilians from being attacked, “UNOCI’s 
military impartiality is one of the cornerstones of its existence in Côte d’Ivoire” (Choi 
in Smith, 2011). Peacekeeping forces are only able to return fire when they are shot at, 
never allowed to initiate fire. This retaliation was seen as aggression by the pro-Gbagbo 
forces, but seen as necessary by the UN workers who remained in the region. UN 
helicopters were flown by Ukranian Ground Forces crews seconded to the UN under 
Resolution 1975, with UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon justifying these actions, “to 
prevent the use of heavy weapons which threaten the civilian population” (Kelemen, 
2011).  
 On April 11, 2011 Laurent Gbagbo, his wife Simone Gbagbo, their son, along 
with some 50 members of his supporters were arrested in his residence. French special 
forces gained access into his home via the French Embassy and Ivorian forces were 
quick to enter the residence and take control of the situation. They were ultimately 
placed under UN guard and eventually referred to the ICC for prosecution of alleged 
crimes against humanity and taken to The Hague, Netherlands to await trial. While it is 
important to acknowledge that in January 2019 Gbagbo was acquitted on all charges, it 
does not mean that the violence he was threatening his people with was not legitimate 
or real, but that there was not enough information available when the case was taken to 
court to establish guilt.  
Côte d’Ivoire is the world’s largest producer of cocoa beans and cashew nuts 
and a large majority of their cocoa beans go to Western European countries known for 
their chocolate, Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. But their economic success has 
been fairly recent, only since 2012, after their election crisis and subsequent political 
instability. They possess the largest economy within Western African Economic and 
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Monetary Union. The five years prior to the conflict were analyzed in terms of the 
economic relationship between Côte d’Ivoire and the major countries listed in the table. 
The EU is one of the largest trading partners, but France is as well, a nod to their 
colonial days. The lack of R2P utilization in this case supports the central hypothesis 
that the convergence of consolidating power and resources with protecting norms and 
values is when R2P is implemented because Côte d’Ivoire did not hold strategic 
importance in the consolidation of power and resources.  
 
Table 2: Côte d’Ivoire Trade Flow 
   
4.3 Yemen Conflict Overview 
 
In the early twentieth century, Yemen was divided between the British and the 
Ottoman empires. After WWI, the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen was established 
in Northern Yemen which then became the Yemen Arab Republic in 1962. South 
Yemen, known as the Aden Protectorate, remained under British rule until 1967 when it 
became an independent state. Briefly, the Southern part was governed under the 
Marxist-Leninist ideology and turned towards becoming a part of the Soviet bloc. This 
lasted for two decades until Prime Minster Bakr al-Attas began to unify the two states 
and in 1990, the Republic of Yemen is formed. Since the formation of the Republic, 
Yemen has maintained an uneasy unity (Dresch, 2000). This tumultuous history is 
partly the reason why the country is currently seeing such a division and the presence of 
extremist activity. The lack of a strong central government has helped create a breeding 
ground for extremist activity, especially with consideration to the Iran-backed Houthi 
rebels targeting the Yemeni government since the early 2000s (Counter Extremism 
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Project, 2018) and the emergence of Al Qaeda on the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) in 
2009. AQAP had been active within the country since 2009 when the Saudi Arabian 
and Yemeni Al Qaeda branches merged. This branch is known for carrying out the fatal 
shooting in the Paris office of the satirical magazine, Charlie Hebdo, in January 2015 
and the involvement in terrorist plots on American soil, including the “Christmas Day 
Bomber” in 2009 and the “Times Square Bomber” in 2010 (Counter Extremism Project, 
2019). The existence of extremist groups further exacerbates the tensions that exist 
within the country’s borders and only further inflames the existing conflict.  
Houthi rebels, also known as ‘Ansar Allah’ (Partisans of God) are an Iran-
backed extremist group and political movement based out of the Saada region in 
northern Yemen. They adhere to a Shia branch of Islam called Zaidism, along with one-
third of the Yemen population. The original intent of the movement was to maintain 
tribal autonomy in northern Yemen and protest Western involvement in the Middle 
East. The goal has since evolved to encompass Houthi rebels seeking more involvement 
in the Yemen government and advocating for Zaidi minority interests, relying on 
support from their large supporter, Iran, with whom they share their sect of Islam 
(Counter Extremism Project, 2019). Very quickly the Houthi rebels would become a 
central fixation of Saudi Arabia. The help they received from Iran cemented the rift 
between the two branches of Islam and the divide between the country further 
deepened.  
The crisis in Yemen began in 2011 with the revolution against President Ali 
Abdullah Saleh. There was corruption, poverty and high unemployment and President 
Saleh was attempting to amend the constitution and eliminate the presidential term limit 
so he could remain in power indefinitely. In March of 2011, police snipers opened fire 
on a pro-democracy camp in Sana’a, killing 50 people and wounding many others. In 
May 2011, clashes between tribal fighters and Yemeni troops caused the death of 
dozens in Sana’a and President Saleh began to lose support from the International 
Community. In October 2011, the UNSC condemned the violence happening in Sana’a 
and called up President Saleh to allow a power transfer. Heeding the call, on November 
23, 2011 President Saleh flew to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and signed the Gulf Cooperation 
Council which outlined a plan for political transition. He agreed to legally transfer the 
office and its powers to his deputy, Vice President Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi, ending his 
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33-year rule. This change in power came after a withdrawal of support from Saudi 
Arabia which led to a U.S. mediated transfer of power which came in the wake of the 
Arab Spring that had already swept through Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya (Amin, 2015, p. 
19). After President Saleh’s removal from office in the early months of 2012, President 
Hadi struggled to unite the fractious political landscape as well as stave off threats from 
both AQAP and Houthi militants, who had been waging a prolonged insurgency in the 
northern part of the country for years. The power vacuum left by the resignation of 
President Saleh allowed rebels to begin moving towards the capital. These groups 
seized the opportunity to capitalize on the instability under President Hadi’s rule. In 
2014, after slowly taking control of provinces across northwest Yemen, Houthi rebels 
took over the capital, Sana’a, and forced President Hadi to negotiate with other political 
factions. Soon after, the Houthis declared themselves in control of the government and 
Yemen descended into a sectarian civil war. The Houthi rebels quickly dissolved the 
parliament and installed an interim Revolutionary Committee led by Mohammed Ali 
Al-Houthi, who was a cousin of main Houthi leader Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi (Amin, 
2015, p. 19). President Hadi relinquished authority and escaped to his hometown in 
Aden in early 2015. While in exile, President Hadi established a temporary capital in 
Aden with the members of the government who fled with him. When Houthi forces 
began to close in on Aden, an international coalition involving Arab states intervened in 
an attempt to stop their progress in taking over the country. This coalition was 
spearheaded by Saudi Arabia after President Hadi requested help and they launched 
‘Operation Decisive Storm’ which included the Gulf states of United Arab Emirates 
(UAE), Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Morocco, Egypt, Jordan, and Sudan (Human Rights 
Council, 2018). The way in Yemen would soon be referred to as ‘The Forgotten War’ 
from the low public knowledge and low media coverage.  
In March 2015, all members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) except 
Oman issued a joint statement that they had decided to intervene in Yemen, at President 
Hadi’s request, in the fight against the Houthi rebels. The coalition then decided that 
Yemeni airspace would be restricted and implemented a no-fly zone. King Salman bin 
Abdulaziz of Saudi Arabia declared that the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) would be in 
control over Yemeni airspace. This came as a response to the Houthi militia taking 
control of the Aden airport (Aboudi, 2015). Saudi Arabia also issued a naval blockade 
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to “stop the alleged smuggling of weapons by Iran to the Houthis” (Safi, 2018) and 
began a bombing campaign to prevent the consolidation of control of Yemen and block 
any attempts by Iran to exert influence. Yemeni forces were able to regain control of the 
airport with support from the Saudi-led military operation. According to the Yemen 
Foreign Minister Riad Yassine, the military operations would continue until the Houthi 
rebels agreed to a peace talk and return all the territory they had taken over since they 
overtook Sana’a in September 2014. Yemen does not recognize the legitimacy of the 
Houthi rule (Aboudi, 2015). Houthi rebels have joined forces with Saleh supporters, 
both of whom reject the rule of President Hadi.  
 Saudi Arabia began a series of air strikes to targets including ground weapons 
and locations with aircrafts. They also targeted the Houthi-controlled missile based in 
Sana’a as Saudi Arabia and its Gulf Allies “believe the Houthis are tools for Iran to 
seize control of Yemen” (Al-Haj, 2015). Yemen faces fragmentation, with the Houthi 
rebels controlling large swaths in the north and several southern provinces including 
Taiz, the third-largest city and the Lahj province, which borders Aden to the north. 
Food storage inside the Yemen Economic Cooperation in Hodeidah, which held enough 
food for the entire country, was destroyed by coalition strikes on March 31, 2015. This 
further intensified the growing food shortage. The government’s military food storage 
center was also targeted and subsequently destroyed in an effort to slow down the 
rebel’s advance. Since 2012, the UN had warned the International Community of the 
deteriorating humanitarian situation in Yemen because of the growing political 
instability and conflict. As of 2015, almost two-thirds of the country faced extreme 
poverty and were in dire need of aid. There is a lack of access to clean drinking water, 
food, and most basic necessities during the coalition strikes which target 
indiscriminately (Almasmari, 2015). On April 21, 2015 the Saudi Defense Ministry 
publicly declared they would be ending Operation Decisive Storm because “it had 
successfully eliminated the threat to the security of Saudi Arabia and neighboring 
countries” (Hamid, 2015) by destroying the heavy machinery and ballistic missile 
capabilities that the Houthi rebels had.  
 By this point in the coalition offensive, the Houthi rebels were managing to 
alienate all the regional players, with the exception of Iran. They had rejected Saudi 
Arabia’s request for negotiations in Riyadh and rejected the UN’s invitation for peace 
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talks in Doha, Qatar. They also disregarded the Security Council’s request to halt their 
rebellion and abide by Yemen’s political transition process. The Security Council had 
passed Resolution 2140 which issued an arms embargo indefinitely and asset freeze 
which was amended and expanded with Resolution 2216 with 14 votes for and one 
abstention (Russian Federation) that acting under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, 
demanded the Houthi rebels withdraw from all areas, return the land they seized to the 
rightful owners and cease all illegal activities (Paragraph 1, (a), (b), (c), 2015). They 
also issued a sanction mandate to freeze all assess pertaining to Abdul-Malik Al-Houthi 
who is the main leader in the Zaidi Islam movement and has made threats to the peace 
and stability of Yemen (UN, 2015). According to the Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) an estimated 24 million people, almost 80% of the 
Yemeni population, need assistance and protection. The conflict has steadily been 
escalating since March 2015 when Resolution 2216 was passed and has dramatically 
aggravated the protection crisis in which millions face risks to their basic safety and 
rights. The last four years of fighting between Government forces and Houthi rebels 
have left tens of thousands of people dead or injured, including at least 17,000 civilians. 
In August 2018, the UN published a report that covered the period between August 
2014 -2018 and outlined the main patterns of human rights violations and abuse of 
international human rights law, international humanitarian law, and the crimes 
committed by all parties in the conflict. They acknowledged that both sides were at 
fault, but that further investigation would be required to identify significant areas where 
violations and abuse occurred. However, within the conclusion of the 41-page report, 
experts say that the individuals of the Yemeni Government, the coalition including 
Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the de facto authorities have committed acts that, subject to 
determination by an independent and impartial court, amount to international crimes. 
These crimes stem from indiscriminate killing of civilians and airstrikes on essential 
civilian necessities such as residential areas, hospitals, and schools. Based on the 
evidence over the years since the conflict began, the Group of Experts within the UN 
Human Rights Council have concluded these may amount to war crimes due to the 
proportionality and scope of these attacks.  
 The Group of Experts was established in December 2017 as the Group of 
Independent Eminent International and Regional Experts to monitor and report on the 
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human rights situation in Yemen. The group was created from Resolution 36/31 in the 
Human Rights Council to determine which applicable fields of international law were 
violated. They identify individuals who may be responsible for international crimes and 
submit the information to the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights. The creation 
of the Group of Experts is also in anticipation of further crimes against humanity and 
continued violence occurring in Yemen, to keep a centralized account of the escalating 
situation in hopes that there will be justice in the future.  
 Yemen’s economy has taken a beating with the ongoing conflict. They are 
contending with a “war-related plunge in the value of its currency against the dollar” 
(Saleh and al-Sakkaf, 2018) which makes it harder for food importers to bring in goods 
and has forced them to raise the prices of what they can bring in (Saleh and al-Sakkaf, 
2018). They are facing an ‘income famine’ which further impoverishes the poor 
population. The economic crisis in Yemen is dangerous because once the violence is 
over the economy will be slow to rebuild due to massive loss of infrastructure and the 
hyperinflation of their currency. Many have the opinion that it will ultimately lead to 
more deaths because people cannot flee from their country. The trade flow in the five 
years preceding the conflict were analyzed and the average is presented in the table 
below. Table 3 should be taken into consideration with respect to Table 4 on the 
following page, an analysis of Saudi Araba’s economic trade flow following the same 
timeline. 
 
Table 3: Yemen Trade Flow 
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As Saudi Arabia is a major player in the Yemeni crisis, the average trade flow 
was analyzed as well following the same time span. The average exports to Saudi 
Arabia and imports from Saudi Arabia are used to illustrate the amount of economic 
power that the country holds in comparison to Yemen. Their geopolitical power within 
the region is demonstrated by their ability to dictate what happens within the Arabian 
Peninsula. They are the largest country on the peninsula and hold an incredible amount 
of power. Their ability to control the Yemen conflict and strongarm the neighboring 
states into joining the coalition illustrates the relative power they possess. The lack of a 
hard R2P response in the Yemen conflict supports the central hypothesis because it 
demonstrates that the social interest alone, protecting the norms and values, is not 
enough to warrant implementation of the principle.  
 
Table 4: Saudi Arabian Trade Flow 
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Chapter 5: Research Design and Comparison 
 
Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, and Yemen will be analyzed and compared using a 
comparative case study format. This involves “the analysis and synthesis of the 
similarities, differences, and patterns across two or more cases that share a common 
focus or goal” (Goodrick, 2014, p. 1). There will be three factors analyzed to determine 
whether or not they were present in the situations, economic interest, social interest, and 
geopolitical interest. There will be a comparison of each conflict and the presence of 
any or all of the factors, according to the hypothesis, will explain why R2P was or was 
not invoked. One of the main points of a comparative case study is using the study to 
answer questions about “causal attribution and contribution when it is not feasible or 
desirable to create a comparison group” (Goodrick, 2014, p. 1). These cases were 
selected because of the relevance of the conflicts within the context related to R2P. The 
conflicts in Libya and Côte d’Ivoire happened concurrently and yet only Libya received 
a firm, hard response from the international community. The conflict in Yemen has 
been ongoing for several years with no end in sight and there have been a multitude of 
condemnations about the international community’s lack of response to the situation, 
especially considering the dire situation the country is facing.   
The goal of comparing and contrasting these three cases is not to ignore that 
there are other, arguably worse conflicts that have happened or are currently happening 
(e.g. Myanmar, Darfur). Instead, this thesis is seeking to start a dialogue about the 
selective implementation of R2P. There is considerable literature about the Libyan 
conflict as it was the only time that R2P was utilized as a justification for intervention. 
However, there is not much written about Côte d’Ivoire and the intent of the thesis is to 
begin a conversation about the conflict. Additionally, Yemen is included because of its 
continued appearance in current humanitarian crisis dialogue and will continue to be 
discussed until action is taken and this area of the world is given the attention it 
deserves. In an ideal situation, all past and present conflicts that fall under the exact 
situation that R2P strives to prevent would be discussed and analyzed, but this is not the 
platform for that to take place. Preferably, conflicts like Côte d’Ivoire and Yemen 
would not be ignored in favor of another more ‘interesting’ conflict or disregarded 
because of a stronger, more powerful ally in the region., This thesis contributes 
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uniquely to the discussion and dialogue of the implementation of R2P within 
international relations.   
However, there are trade-offs for using this style of research design. There are 
problems with case selection and “the danger of selection bias, which can have more 
severe consequences in case studies than in statistical studies” (Bennet, 2004, p. 19). 
The inherent limitations of the comparative case study format also include “their 
relative inability to render judgement on the frequency or representativeness of the 
particular cases and their weak capability for estimating the average ‘causal weight’ of 
variables” (Bennet, 2004, p. 20). The limitation of excluding other conflicts could have 
an effect on the analysis. However, comparative case studies have the advantage of 
“operationalization and measurement of qualitative variables (construct validity), the 
heuristic identification of new variables or hypotheses, the examination of potential 
causal mechanisms within particular cases or contexts” (Bennet, 2004, p. 34) as well as 
a historical explanation. These studies can identify new variables through ordinary 
fieldwork, such as archival research or interviews. By including qualitative answers in 
the study new factors can be included and analyzed to help explain certain phenomena. 
Another advantage of using comparative case studies is their ability to “accommodate 
complex casual relations” which include the economic, social, and geopolitical factors.  
The comparison part of a comparative case study is “focused because it deals 
selectively with only certain aspects of the historical case… and structure because it 
employs general questions to guide the data collection analysis in that historical case” 
(George, 1979, p. 61-62). The first step in comparative case study research is 
identifying a specific research question upon which there will be a focused comparison. 
The second step is identifying variables from any existing theory and conduct a 
literature review. The third step is case selection, which also tends to be the most 
difficult because of the danger of selection bias. The fourth step is operationalizing the 
variables. The fifth step is coding the variables, identifying the case(s) that do not fit the 
hypothesis. The sixth step is comparisons and analysis (Kaarbo and Beasley, 1999). 
 The economic data was collected from the OEC database. It is a database that 
collects information on countries and the products they exchange. Additionally, data 
provided by Eurostat was collected from the database Extra-EU trade by partner which 
analyzed the five years prior to each conflict and the total economic trade balance 
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between the EU and each country in the comparison. Saudi Arabia was also analyzed 
because of their economic control on the Arabian Peninsula and the role they play in the 
Yemen conflict. The total trade amount of the EU is provided in Euros, so the currency 
was converted using the standardized annual exchange rate (Statista) of the years 
analyzed. In the case of Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, the average economic trade flow from 
years 2006 to 2010 were provided and in the case of Yemen and Saudi Arabia, the 
average from the years 2010 to 2014. The conversion of Euros to U.S. Dollars is to 
keep the economic tables consistent in the representation of trade flows. However, the 
Euro during this time period was heavily favored and was worth significantly more than 
it is now.   
 There were several databases used to collect information to establish social 
interest. One of the databases is the World Food Programme (WFP) which provides 
information on the percentage of the population living below international poverty level 
and the amount of people who face imminent food insecurity. All these factors 
represent the situation within the country beyond the violence and help portray the 
country from a different perspective. The second database used to gather this 
information is the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data Project (ACLED) which is a 
conflict collection and crisis mapping project. The third, Relief Web, a digital service 
provided by the OCHA. Fourth, Human Rights Watch (HRW) which provides 
humanitarian information for effective responses. And finally, the Humanitarian Aid 
and Civil Protection (ECHO) department of the European Commission 
 Geopolitical interest was established through the presence of natural resources, 
such as oil and petroleum.  Regional stability was also considered, taking the major 
regional powers into consideration and the influence they possessed. The combination 
of political and economic factors is part of what constitutes geopolitics, as well as 
taking into account the physical location of the country.  
There will be several types of measurement used. To measure economic interest, 
the annual average of the five years preceding the conflict will be presented along with 
the total percentage of imports and exports. These numbers will demonstrate the 
amount of trade that the case countries had with the P5 and the EU. The goal of 
measuring economic interest is first to establish the trade relationship, then illustrate the 
value of the relationship in millions of U.S. Dollar. To provide a measurement aid to 
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quantify social interest, six factors will be analyzed. First, the total population at the 
time of the conflict. Second, taking into consideration the population size with respect 
to the amount of lacking access to basic sanitation. Third, the amount of people not 
knowing where their next meal will come from (food insecurity). Fourth, the total 
amount of unintended civilian deaths. Fifth, how many are internally displaced (IDPs). 
And sixth, the overall number of people within the country who are in need of 
humanitarian assistance. Establishing these statistics allows to compare and contrast the 
social situation within each country. The final variable, geopolitical interest will be 
measured in the absence of or presence of interest. All of these variables will be 
presented within the next chapter in Tables 5 through 7 for comparison followed by a 
final table, Table 8 which compares all three variables and the resulting utilization of 
R2P.   
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Chapter 6: Empirical Analysis 
 
The idea behind the creation of R2P was the obligations of states to not only 
protect their populations, but to also step in and intervene when others manifestly fail to 
do so. It was an attempt made by the international community to acknowledge mass 
atrocities, to share the responsibility to help protect and prevent one another from 
violent crimes. This goal is rooted in history, because the century before the world saw 
millions die from preventable conflicts. In theory, it sounds ideal. In reality, it has only 
been truly utilized once. Libya marked the first time in UN history that the Security 
Council authorized an international R2P operation. Throughout the development of the 
R2P principle there were continued supplementary features added in hopes of making 
the principle more effective and legitimate. As per the requirements outlined in the UN 
Charter, Article 24(3), the Security Council submits an annual report to the General 
Assembly disseminate the issues that were raised and how the council functioned. The 
report in 2011 detailed how they added a regional dimension of the implementation 
strategy to develop regional and sub-regional bodies in the application of the 
responsibility to protect principle. Within this new dimension, the Economic 
Community of West Africa (ECOWAS), the African Union (AU), and the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) were included to help “vanguard the 
international efforts to develop both the principles of protection and the practical tools 
for implementing them” (Article 2, (4)). However, the report acknowledged that in 
practice, the regional and sub-regional cooperation has a long way to go before it 
reaches its full potential in preventing genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity. In the following paragraphs, the UNSC recognizes the views 
of the neighboring states and regional bodies should be taken into account when 
determining a course of action in particular conflicts (Article 2 (6)). The ultimate goal 
of R2P is not to rely on intervention, but rather lay the groundwork for reasserting and 
reinforcing sovereign responsibilities of the State and it affirms that a core function of 
international organizations is to “permit the full and peaceful expression of sovereignty 
in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter and the provisions of 
international law” (Article 3(10)). Preventing mass atrocities is a legal responsibility of 
the sovereign State and a moral responsibility of the individual. The inclusion of 
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regional and sub-regional organizations can help encourage governments to recognize 
their obligations to identify and address the sources of violence. It is with these 
organizations that the UN relies on, to help mitigate the issue and avoid intervention. 
However, as seen with Libya, the UN has the capacity to intervene when the situation 
presents itself.  
Before the bombing campaign commenced, the ICC was “unequivocal in its 
belief that crimes against humanity had been committed by Libya’s leader against his 
people” (Carment and Landry, 2014), but committed without a full and proper 
investigation on the ground as to discover who was perpetrating such crimes.  
Furthermore, this boxed President Gaddafi into a corner and there is little surprise that 
he lashed out and escalated the conflict. Little effort was made to properly mediate this 
conflict before escalating to the bombing campaign and the conflict rapidly escalated 
out of control and “had there been any openings available to the West to deescalate and 
avoid bloodshed, those were lost once threats to intervene were clearly made by 
President Obama and the leaders of the allied nations” (Rashid, 2013). The regional and 
sub-regional organizations that existed in the area were not utilized and therefore could 
not fulfill their potential in potentially mediating the conflict. This utilization of the 
R2P doctrine was not a watershed moment. The principle, in effect, was violated along 
the way and “while many ordinary citizens may have been saved from the conflict, we 
can only guess as to whether, indeed, that is true since a conclusion requires a 
counterfactual analysis using information that is not easily evaluated and assessed” 
(Rashid, 2013). In reality, the practice of the R2P principle in Libya merely showed the 
us that the principle is easily politically manipulated.  
One of the aspects of the Libyan crisis that exacerbated the conflict was the 
breakdown of social and civil services. President Gaddafi had socialized a lot of the 
government which allowed a lot of the population to have access to the services they 
would not normally have. There was free education and healthcare, but once the 
economy collapsed the country faced a trade deficit which exacerbated the poverty, 
insecurity, violence, internal and external displacement, and food shortage (OCHA, 
2016). The World Food Programme’s assessment indicated that 60% of the Libyan 
population (3.6 million) are vulnerable to food insecurity and the destruction to the 
infrastructure of the country has been a detriment to its recovery.  
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Some of the momentum gained from the Libya conflict has manifested itself in 
the form of ambivalence towards the conflict currently happening in Syria, Yemen, and 
other Arab states. It is worth noting that while the situation in Libya was ramping up, 
some were arguing that the international community should be looking to Syria or 
Yemen instead who were also facing humanitarian crises. “In Libya they intervene to 
protect the people and insurgents against the regime, but in Bahrain, the Inter-Arab 
intervention, authorized, or at least tolerated by Western powers is to protect the regime 
against the people!” (Benatar, 2011, p. 6) Benatar claims that the Western powers 
intervention in Libya justified the military operation using a moral excuse, but this 
moral excuse is highly selective when it comes to global validity. He does highlight an 
important factor, that the international community is selectively implementing the 
principles of the R2P doctrine and based on its reasoning for intervention in Libya, 
there should be intervention in elsewhere. However, the geopolitical interests in Libya 
are different than in other countries involved in armed conflicts and thus interventions 
are not likely to happen, so it did not happen in Côte d’Ivoire, nor will it happen in the 
future with the conflict in Yemen This supports the central hypothesis that the 
convergence of all interests needs to happen to warrant intervention. Morals alone are 
not enough.  
To further complicate the conflict in Côte d’Ivoire, there was an existing UN 
peacekeeping mission (UNOCI) that had been created with Resolution 1528 in 2004. 
They were initially deployed to protect civilians, but the mission was absorbed by the 
ECOWAS forces and the UN Mission in Côte d’Ivoire (MINUCI) in 2007 which had a 
political mission as well. They were tasked with overseeing the elections which had 
already been postponed multiple times by the time the elections finally took place in 
2011. When President Gbagbo refused to step down the mandate was extended until 
December 2011 and he took this as a personal offense and called on his supporters to 
target them, thus resulting in the peacekeeping officials to return fire. The UN had been 
relying on the AU and ECOWAS to keep the peace rather than stepping in like they did 
in Libya. But they did not “deploy a timely and robust mission to protect the civilians 
caught in post-election crossfire” (Aning and Salihu, 2012, p. 31). Additionally, they 
lacked the capacity to adequately provide the protection the civilians needed. Therefore, 
there is a need for the international community to prioritize the protection of civilians in 
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all conflicts and should be supported by a comprehensive understanding of the conflict 
situations to enable the “framing and deployment of the appropriate peace support 
missions” (Aning and Salihu, 2012, p. 31) and the response should be proportional to 
the conflict. 
The World Food Programme has been in Côte d’Ivoire since 1968 and has 
played a role in the development of the securing continued access to food. They have 
implemented school meals and food assistance within country to guarantee as much 
nutritional support as possible. They estimate that around 7% of the babies and young 
children within the country suffer from malnutrition and 23% of people live below the 
international poverty line out of a population of 22.7 million people. 
Côte d’Ivoire was the first time the Security Council authorized the use of 
military force by outside powers for the PoC mandate. The PoC mandate refers to a 
broad range of structures and policies developed by the UN, based on international 
humanitarian law and human rights law to protect vulnerable populations from the 
effects of armed conflict. It has become synonymous with peacekeeping operations. 
Partly due to the complexity of the problem in Côte d’Ivoire and also due to the 
different actors involved, the PoC mission struggled over what it meant in relation to 
protect the civilians, in theory and in practice. There is a blurred definition of who 
constitutes a civilian. The lack of clarity of the term ‘civilian’ “is perhaps due to the 
fluidity of the term in contemporary conflict situations in Africa” (Aning and Salihu, 
2012, p. 30) and this causes issues when the peacekeepers have to draw the line 
between who is a combatant and who is a civilian. When the international community 
failed to act in a timely manner to stop the mass atrocities being committed in Côte 
d’Ivoire not only were there challenges stemming from a lack of clarity on the political 
and operational constraints, but these contributed to the mandate of protecting civilians. 
This was especially disconcerting considering the exceptionally timely response the 
UNSC had in responding to President Gaddafi.  
The steps taken by the international community towards UN Resolution 1973 
were slow but deliberate and upon the final decision it was met with resounding 
condemnation. In Côte d’Ivoire, electoral contestation and the “incumbent’s obstinacy-
combined with the lacy of civil war and ethnic cleavages- led to the commission of 
mass atrocities” (Global R2P, 2011). Given the history of the country and the previous 
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ethnic tensions and political issues they experienced the international community 
should have planned for the possibility of a ‘hotly contested’ election in which Laurent 
Gbagbo would refuse to cede power to Alassane Ouattara. There should have been a 
contingency plan in place to protect the civilians who were at risk and such a plan 
would have mandated the UN to expand the PoC and deploy more troops or even 
invoke R2P like they did in Libya to prevent the massacre of more than 500 people 
between the days of March 28 and 29, 2011. In undertaking Resolution 1975, the UN 
and France launched several airstrikes against the presidential residence which was 
believed to be under control of pro-Gbagbo forces. Such action was taken in retaliation 
of the force used against the peacekeeping forces left in Abidjan, but it came too late 
with the massacre in Duékoué that could have been prevented had the UN acted in a 
more timely and robust manner.  
In the case of Libya, the case was immediately referred to the ICC while 
Laurent Gbagbo and his former militia leader, Charles Blé Goudé, were only referred to 
the ICC at the request of Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo. He wrote a letter to 
President Song in which he explains that he has reason to believe that crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court have been committed in Côte d’Ivoire since 28 November 
2010 (Moreno-Ocampo, 2011). Both pleaded not guilty to four counts of crimes against 
humanity, including murder, rape and persecution in the five months of violence that 
wracked Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire in the early months of 2011. In a document released by 
the ICC, the alleged crime list for Gbagbo reads, “Laurent Gbagbo is accused of having 
engaged his individual criminal responsibility for four counts of crimes against 
humanity, in Abidjan, Côte d’Ivoire, jointly with members of his inner circle and 
through members of the pro-Gbagbo forces (articles 25(3)(a) of the Rome Statue), or in 
the alternative, for ordering soliciting and inducing the commission of these crimes 
(Article 25(3)(b) of the Rome Statue)” (ICC, 2016). On January 15, 2019 the Trail 
Chamber I of the ICC acquitted both Gbagbo and Blé Goudé from all charges of crimes 
against humanity. The Chamber concluded that the Prosecutor failed to demonstrate 
several core constitutive elements of the crimes they were charged. They also 
concluded that the Prosecutor failed to demonstrate Gbagbo and Blé Goudé ordered 
mass atrocity crimes to be committed within their public speeches. There is speculation 
that this decision will be appealed by the Prosecutor. The fact remains that they were 
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referred to the ICC and this does not detract from the validity of the argument. 
Beginning in March 2011, the ICC opened an investigation on Gaddafi, issued arrest 
warrants in June 2011, but ultimately terminated the case in November 2011 with his 
death. With Yemen, the Human Rights Council agreed to establish an independent 
investigation into the alleged human rights abuses as well as assisting with the national 
commission of inquiry into Yemeni President Hadi. While these actions fall short of a 
formal International Commission of Inquiry, there is an investigation which is a step 
forward in the right direction for holding all sides in the Yemeni conflict accountable. 
Notably, “neither one of these developments involve the ICC. In fact, they actively 
exclude ICC involvement” (Curtis, 2017) and this lack of establishing the case in the 
ICC ultimately the independent investigation carries no international jurisdictional 
weight.  
While the UN acted in both Libya and Côte d’Ivoire, the response was both 
disproportional and unequal in both capacity and follow-through. Almost immediately 
after President Gaddafi began threatening the population with violence did the UN 
voice their opinion that not only was he failing to protect his people, but it was also 
Gaddafi himself inciting violence within the country and should be stopped. Less than 
48 hours after Resolution 1973 was passed there was a no-fly zone implemented over 
Libyan airspace and U.S. and NATO forces were conducting airstrikes against 
President Gaddafi and his forces. Following the same timeline, the UN Security 
Council authorized UNOCI to “use any force necessary” as expressly written in the 
Resolution 1975 (1) “demands an immediate end to the violence against civilians, 
including women, children and Internally displaced persons.” Also, in paragraph 6 
“[r]ecalls its authorization and stresses its full support given to the UNOCI, while 
impartially implementing its mandate, to use all necessary means to carry out its 
mandate to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence” which allows 
the UNOCI troops there to use force. The UN does not allow its peacekeeping forces to 
engage in violence unless they were fired upon. So, while the UN did condemn 
President Gbagbo, it is only after his supporters wounded multiple peacekeepers and 
fired upon the mission headquarters that peacekeepers were allowed to engage in fire. 
Unfortunately, the Resolutions passed in regard to Yemen are not enforceable nor do 
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they carry much weight as both the Yemen and the Saudi side continue fighting and do 
not respect the multiple attempts for a ceasefire.  
Looking at civilian casualties in all conflicts provides a perspective of the 
violence being committed but does not necessarily separate the issues in terms of 
severity. A civilian casualty is still a loss of innocent life and that stands for itself. 
However, under the technical aspects of R2P, the avoidance of ‘mass atrocity crimes’ is 
key to invoking the principle, but where does the international community draw the line 
on what constitutes a mass atrocity crime? Is there a minimum number of civilian 
casualties to be considered ‘mass’? In Libya, the number of civilians killed by rebel 
forces amounts to approximately 1,800 from a population of almost 7 million. 
However, Libya was involved in a Civil War from March to October of 2011 and there 
is a large disparity between the number of causalities due to the media being banned 
from reporting on the war and lack of incentives on both sides to admit illegal crimes. 
Estimates vary with figures from 2,500 to 25,000, but the exact number is hard to 
identify. Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon said that about 15,000 Libyans fled via Egypt 
and 22,000 fled via Tunisia. In comparison, during the Second Ivorian Civil War, Côte 
d’Ivoire saw about 3,000 dead from March to May 2011 with a population of about 23 
million and about 100,000 Ivorians fled to neighboring Liberia and 28,000 internally 
displaced persons living in refugee camps in the western part of the country (DiCampo, 
2011). In a report published by Human Rights Watch there were detailed specifics from 
witnesses to the atrocities committed by both sides of the conflict and it explained that 
many of the causes of the conflict were clear, “a decade of state-led discrimination 
against northerners and West African immigrants over the manipulated notion of 
citizenship; incitation to hatred against these groups; the proliferation of violent militia 
groups and their close collaboration with Gbagbo’s elite security forces; a failed 
judicial system; and, most directly, Gbagbo’s refusal to hand over power after losing 
the run-off” (Wells and Dufka, 2011).  
Even before the conflict in Yemen broke out the country was one of the poorest 
nations in the Arab world. As the conflict in Yemen has continued the death toll 
continues to rise. According to the UNHCR, as many as 100 civilian casualties occurred 
each week in 2018. The conflict has left more than 14 million people in need of 
protection and forced around 3.3 million internally displaced persons (UNHCR, 2019). 
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The UN estimates that over 60,000 people have been killed in Yemen since 2016 
(ReliefWeb, 2018) and that cholera is responsible for infecting almost 1.1 million 
Yemenis (Walsh, 2018).  According to the World Food Programme, 15.9 million 
people wake up hungry every day. Of the nearly 2 million malnourished Yemeni 
children, nearly 400,000 are considered critically ill and are in dire need of nutrition or 
face imminent starvation. The total population of the country is only 30.5 million 
people and about 60% of the country is in need of immediate humanitarian assistance.  
The intent of explaining the casualties is not to minimize any conflict, but to 
compare the situations within the countries and put the context of each into perspective. 
The UN agrees that in all instances that there were clear crimes against humanity 
committed which violates international humanitarian law. The wording of the R2P 
principle does not necessitate a mandatory usage, rather it is a justification for action. It 
provides the international community an avenue to intervene on humanitarian grounds, 
but does not require intervention. In Libya, the international community acted on the 
grounds of the R2P principle and intervened, but did not act on these same grounds in 
Côte d’Ivoire, nor has the UN intervened in Yemen to stop the escalating violence. The 
intervention had political clout and international legitimacy that was supported by the 
economic, social and geopolitical interests that the international community had in 
Libya. The intersection of all these interests provides the platform upon which the 
international community acts, the drive to consolidate power and resources overlaps 
with the desire to uphold norms and values, which supports the central hypothesis of 
this thesis.  
 




The total average of the U.S., Russia, China, and the EU export value and 
import value were added together to demonstrate the just how much weight the 
economic value had. As France and the U.K. are in the P5 and also the EU, the total EU 
value was considered to illustrate the economic relationship. Looking at Table 5, it 
becomes clear that the economic relationship between Saudi Arabia and the major 
countries is much larger and stronger in comparison the Yemen and the major 
countries. The trade relationship between the case countries and the P5 and the EU 
shows the value of economic interest and helps in explaining state’s intervention.  
When examining the economic relationship with Yemen, it is important to also 
look at Saudi Arabia. Comparing Tables 3 and 4 illustrates the economic power that 
Saudi Arabia holds when compared to Yemen. Not only is Saudi Arabia the largest 
country on the Arabian Peninsula, but it also has the largest oil reserves. Throughout 
Yemen and Saudi Arabia’s relationship Yemen has largely remained in its shadow. 
When President Hadi approached Riyadh and asked for help in retaliation against the 
Houthi rebels Saudi Arabia not only shouldered the bulk of the air strikes, but 
continually ignores the UN’s request to maintain a ceasefire. Under the leadership of 
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, “the Saudi-led coalition and its Yemeni allies 
have imposed a raft of punitive economic measures aimed at undercutting the Houthi 
rebels who control northern Yemen” (Walsh, 2018). These actions have further 
exacerbated the economic issues facing the country and driving millions deeper into 
poverty. Yemen is not only facing a famine, but also an economic famine with the 
infrastructure slowly being destroyed, jobs being lost, currency weakening, and rising 
inflation. Yet Saudi Arabia says they, along with UAE, are the largest aid donors to 
Yemen’s looming humanitarian crisis and defend their actions saying they are 
protecting the Sunni Muslim religion. This economic crisis was not unavoidable. In 
2016, the Saudi-backed Yemeni government transferred banking operations from the 
Houthi-controlled capital, Sana’a, to the southern city of Aden where President Hadi 
resided. The banks were backed by Saudi Arabia and began printing millions of new 
riyals and this caused an inflationary spiral that eroded the value of any savings people 
had left. Those who were left in the Houthi-controlled had no access to currency and 
suddenly faced a shortage in income with no guarantee it would return. Because Saudi 
Arabia is such a major player, not only in the Arabian Peninsula, but in the world 
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economy, it is clear that they are one of the major reasons Yemen is not receiving the 
aid they need. They hold more power in the region than Yemen and possess almost 
infinite resources. But they are not solely to blame for the crisis in Yemen. The 
origination of the issue stems from the Houthi rebels, however, the Saudi influence is 
exacerbating the problems instead of alleviating them.  
 
Table 6: Social Interest Comparison 
 
Within Table 6, the factors used to explain social interest are laid out for 
comparison. The total population of each country at the time of the crisis is presented 
and the statistics regarding the amount of people lacking basic sanitation, those facing 
food insecurity, overall civilian casualties, the amount of internally displaced persons, 
and the total number of those in need of humanitarian assistance. The purpose of 
comparing these is to illustrate the severity of the situation. All three conflicts were 
analyzed the five factors were examined to establish social interest, and the results are 
displayed in Table 6. Yemen has the largest population of the three conflicts, but also 
has the largest percentage of population affected. Libya is the smallest country of the 
three and while their numbers are much lower than the other two conflicts, they 
suffered, nonetheless. The point of providing these numbers was not to compare levels 
of severity, but to illustrate that there were people impacted by the violence and put the 
conflicts into context. And in the case of Yemen, these numbers continue to rise. 
The UN agreed that in both Libya and Côte d’Ivoire there were threats to the 
peace and security of the country. In the case of Libya, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon 
asked President Gaddafi to stop threatening the use of violence against innocent 
civilians and when he ignored the request the UN acted in accordance and used as much 
force as they felt was necessary. In Côte d’Ivoire, the MINUCI peacekeeping mission 
was deployed to prevent the escalation of violence, but unfortunately was unable to 
complete their mission. They were ultimately replaced by the UNOCI and, according to 
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Human Rights Watch, have successfully demonstrated evidence of improved security 
(2017). The UN cites this mission as a success and has since closed their doors and left 
the country. However, the departure coupled with recent mutinies “underscore the need 
to intensify efforts to address longstanding impunity and professionalize the security 
forces” (Human Rights Watch, 2017) which would include strengthening the military 
justice system to hold those accountable for actions taken in the 2011 conflict and 
improving the disciplinary mechanisms. The Ivorian government is now the sole party 
responsible for addressing the human rights challenges that threaten the stability of the 
country. If the UN had taken proper steps as outlined in the R2P doctrine and address 
pillars one and two, perhaps Côte d’Ivoire would not be facing continued ethnic 
tensions and conflict.  
Famine has only officially been declared by the UN in the last 20 years, in 
Somalia and in South Sudan. This changed in 2018 when famine was officially declared 
by the UN because Yemen is not only facing a vast food shortage, but also an income 
famine. People simply do not have enough money to buy enough food to keep 
themselves alive. The currency continues to fluctuate which impairs the ability of 
traders and shipping companies to import food safely into the country. The Saudis have 
learned that they can get away with a lot in Yemen considering the high bar for Western 
tolerance. The World Food Programme and the Food Agriculture Organization has 
officially determined that 73,000 Yemeni civilians in rebel-held areas are enduring 
famine conditions. Since 2015, a stalled peace process and a severe economic decline 
that has accelerated the collapse of essential basic services and institutions. Yemen is 
facing a protracted political, humanitarian and developmental crisis. The country is 
facing the world’s largest humanitarian crisis with 22.2 million people (close to 75% of 
the population) in need of humanitarian aid and protection and no ability to for aid 
workers to provide it (Special Envoy Yemen, Department of Political and 
Peacebuilding Affairs, 2012). Additionally, Yemen is in the middle of one of the largest 
cholera epidemics in recent history (WHO, 2018) and with only half of health facilities 
fully functioning, the capability of the health system to respond to disease and injuries 
is compromised. Over 50% of the Yemeni population are in need of urgent assistance 
and despite UN efforts, fighting continues to happen.  
 73 
 All three conflicts were analyzed the five factors were examined to establish 
social interest, and the results are displayed in Table 6. Yemen has the largest 
population of the three conflicts, but also has the largest percentage of population 
affected. Libya is the smallest country of the three and while their numbers are much 
lower than the other two conflicts, they suffered, nonetheless. The point of providing 
these numbers was not to compare levels of severity, but to illustrate that there were 
people impacted by the violence and put the conflicts into context. And in the case of 
Yemen, these numbers continue to rise. 
 
Table 7: Geopolitical Interest Comparison 
 
The comparison table presented above is an illustrative guide to present the 
three factors included in establishing geopolitical interest and contrast them in each 
conflict. In the case of Libya, there was natural resource security, regional stability, and 
existing state relations that created the presence of geopolitical interest. In the case of 
Côte d’Ivoire, there were existing state relations especially with France but that was not 
enough to create the presence of geopolitical interest. In regard to Yemen, there was no 
presence of natural resource security, no regional stability, and no existing state 
relations because of the existing political ties with their regional hegemon, Saudi 
Arabia. There is a presence of geopolitical interest with Saudi Arabia which resulted in 
the absence of geopolitical interest in Yemen.  
The U.S. had geopolitical interests in Libya which shaped their response to the 
crisis because, “Libya is also a theater for the power competitions among North Africa 
and Middle Eastern states, with American allies and partners on both sides” (Estelle, 
2017, p. 1).  The U.S. especially have a stake in Libyan politics stemming from the 
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origination of Gaddafi’s rule, as they had originally backed Gaddafi in the coup d’état 
to take out King Idris and recognized the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) in 
1969. The Nixon administration decided to maintain a diplomatic relationship with 
Libya and Gaddafi in the hope of establishing a more economic connection to 
potentially influence the state into becoming more pro-Western (U.S. Government, 
White House Files, 2011). The country’s proximity to the European continent played a 
role in the EU’s response and their geopolitical interest in Libya as the country is a “key 
transit node for the migrant flow destabilizing Europe” (Estelle, 2017, p. 1). Libya is 
one of the major ports through which migrants are reaching the Mediterranean in an 
attempt to land on European soil to claim asylum. But the Libyan crisis is no longer 
confined to Libya. It has spread throughout Northern Africa destabilizing the continent, 
fueling geopolitical competitions, and exacerbating the European migrant crisis. After 
the fall of Gaddafi and the controls he placed on migration became destabilized and 
“uncorked massive migrant flows” (Estelle, 2017, p. 5). An overwhelming majority of 
migrants from Sub-Saharan Africa are seeking better opportunities in Europe and are 
attempting to cross the Mediterranean and enter through Italy, relying on the protocols 
in place within the EU legal system to protect them once they reach European soil. 
With the incorporation of geopolitical interest into the decision to intervene or not to 
intervene, the choice carries more weight. The economic relationship between Libya 
and the EU is one built on proximity and access to the market. Libya has a strong 
economic relationship with the U.S., France, and the U.K, and are responsible for a 
sizeable portion of the total import and export amount. The UN decided, with the 
passing of Resolutions 1970 and 1975, there were violations of humanitarian rights and 
acting under the Charter, took a stand to stop the violence. The physical proximity to 
the EU and the location of the country was of importance to both the EU and to the U.S. 
in their relations within the region and they acted according to protect those interests.  
Under the guise of Operation Decisive Storm, Saudi Arabia’s intervention can 
be interpreted as a step towards curbing Iranian expansion into the Arabian Peninsula 
rather than a step towards protecting Yemen during its civil war. The coalition is made 
up of nine Arab countries, including Egypt, Morocco, Jordan, Sudan, the UAE, Kuwait, 
Qatar, and Bahrain. Operation Decisive Storm ended in April 2015 and the coalition 
launched Operation Restoring Hope. The use of force did not end. Airstrikes have 
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caused the majority of the civilian deaths in Yemen, but the Houthi rebels have also 
used weapons to kill indiscriminately. Qatar was suspended from the coalition due to 
the 2017 Qatari Diplomatic Crisis (Ulrichsen, 2018) and Morocco withdrew their 
support in early 2019 due to the deterioration of the Moroccan-Saudi relations (Bey, 
2019). The war is widely seen as a proxy war between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Yemen is 
stuck between a rock and a hard place. They had relied on Saudi Arabia for years and 
now are being held hostage in their own country. “Saudi Arabia’s tight control over all 
air and sea movements into northern Yemen has effectively made the area a prison for 
those who live there” (Walsh, 2018). Saudi Arabia is such a major player on the 
Arabian Peninsula, both economically and physically, that they control the peninsula. 
Because Saudi Arabia is such a regional power, the attempt to not upset regional 
stability can be explained through inaction of the international community. Intervention 
could potentially upset natural resource security and state relations in the Arabian 
Peninsula. Côte d’Ivoire had a relationship with France stemming from their colonial 
days, but it was not strong enough to warrant intervention.  
U.N. sponsored peace talks in September 2018 failed before they could get off 
the ground. This failure was in part caused by the absence of the Houthi rebels who 
claim they were blocked by Saudi Arabia as they have control over Yemeni airspace. 
Neither side is willing to come to a conclusion on regional negotiations and have come 
to a stalemate. Saudi Arabia has repeatedly blocked a cease-fire agreement in late 
October/early November and the U.S. and China backed this opposition because they 
were seeking an all-encompassing strategy rather than limiting the ceasefire to one 
location. Neither France nor Russia had an opinion on the ceasefire resolution. The U.S. 
has a primary goal of supporting Saudi Arabia in defeating the Houthi rebels and 
pushing back against Iran’s influence in Yemen (DeYoung and Ryan, 2017). However, 
in 2018 U.S. Congress voted to end American involvement in Yemen. Many had 
expressed concern over the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia and the 
push to end involvement also signaled the beginning of renewed humanitarian interest 





Table 8: Overall Comparison 
 
 
The international community selectively utilized R2P in Libya and justified 
humanitarian intervention for the sake of protecting the Libyan population from their 
leader, President Gaddafi. Despite a similar situation in Côte d’Ivoire, there was no 
utilization of R2P, nor was there intervention. There was a duty of the Security Council 
to uphold the UN Charter, but with the lack of economic and geopolitical interest in the 
country there was no action. The world is watching as Yemen is coming into its 4th year 
of a conflict and the majority of its population is in need of humanitarian assistance. 
There are obvious and clear social interests in the country, but the geopolitical interest 
is with maintaining the regional stability by placating Saudi Arabia and following their 
lead in the conflict. R2P “is based on undemocratic and unsustainable premises. It 
discriminates between powerful and weak states and thus resembles the much 
condemned and obsolete Indian caste system- who will get and give up what rights in a 
hierarchical system” (Nuruzzaman, 2014). This utilization of the R2P principle was not 
a watershed moment, it was a demonstration of how easily it can be politically 
manipulated to fit the situation at hand. The explanation for this behavior boils down to 
Western intervention is justified using a moral excuse, but this moral excuse is highly 
selective when it comes to global validity, “generally, the conduct of the Western 
powers regarding Bahrain and elsewhere contradicts the values that it is supposed to 
promote in Libya” (Benatar, 2011, p. 6). 
Analyzing the three factors within the lens of constructivism, the theory would 
hold true if in all situations there was intervention under the justification of R2P. The 
international community would be intervening on behalf of upholding the norms and 
values as enshrined within the UN Charter. They intervened in Libya to protect the 
civilians targeted by Gaddafi supporters. They would have intervened in Côte d’Ivoire 
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to support the innocent civilians targeted by pro-Gbagbo supporters and tried to stop the 
mass internal displacement and exodus to find safety. They would be intervening in 
Yemen to stop the humanitarian crisis currently happening. People would not be facing 
imminent starvation and children would have access to the medical and nutritional care 
they so desperately need if upholding norms and values was the crux of the utilization 
of R2P. Rather, under the realist lens, the utilization of the R2P principle holds true 
when the international community intervene at the juxtaposition of all three factors. 
When there is an economic, a social, and a geopolitical interest. The P5 would not be 
scrutinized for selectively choosing conflicts to intervene in because there would be a 
blanket utilization of R2P in all situations that fulfilled the criteria. The UNSC would 
be accomplishing the duty of protecting the innocent and the weak as they were 





The objective of the thesis was to analyze three conflicts: Libya, Côte d’Ivoire, 
and Yemen, compare and contrast them, and answer several questions- What factors 
affected the application of the R2P principle in states’ intervention? Why was R2P used 
in some instances of humanitarian crises but not others? Two theoretical lenses were 
introduced and using factors from both a theoretical framework was established from 
which the conflicts were analyzed. Using an intersection of Realism and 
Constructivism, the points of convergence were within the intersection of the desire to 
seek out power and resources and the desire to uphold norms and values. The 
framework acknowledged and accepted that the state is the central actor, that they are 
rational, and their actions are a reflection of their self-interest, and that all states desire 
power to ensure self-preservation. One of the roots of Constructivism is that 
international relations is socially and historically constructed, and this was considered 
to be integral to the framework because states have demonstrated in the past through the 
formation of alliances, foreign policies based on identity and values, to be inherent in 
the decision-making process. The factors analyzed (economic, social, and geopolitical 
interests) were selected because of their relevance within the theoretical framework and 
their ability to illustrate the concepts as outlined within both theories. Economic and 
geopolitical interests are representative of the priorities of the Realist approach and 
social interests is reflective of the priorities of the Constructivist approach.  
One of the purposes of the thesis was to establish the foundation of R2P to help 
explain why the principle was originally created and for what purpose it was intended. 
Secretary-General Kofi Annan’s original wish for the international community was to 
avoid another Rwandan Genocide or another Srebrenica massacre. While the principle 
was established on emotional grounds, it held political and social weight as the world 
saw the end of the Cold War and moved into a new century. No longer could countries 
hide their atrocities. The principle is literally rooted in the ‘responsibility to protect’ and 
does not deal with the semantics of motivation, so the international community would 
not have to dissect the actions taken by the leaders of the countries they were 
intervening in, but intervene on humanitarian grounds. This is not to be confused with 
humanitarian intervention, which is centered around military intervention. Both deal 
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with mass atrocity crimes (genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, or crimes against 
humanity), but R2P is a two-pronged approach, prevention then intervention.  
When the UNSC passed Resolution 1970 on February 26, 2011 it was hailed as 
a groundbreaking diplomatic moment. Then on March 17, 2011 Resolution 1973 was 
passed which was regarded as a “timely and proportional intervention to ensure the 
protection of civilians at grave risk of mass atrocities” (Adams, 2012, p. 3) which was 
only invoked as a last resort. In the years since, there has been debate regarding the 
meaning of these resolutions and their implementation. Some feel that the intervention 
was hijacked by enthusiasts of ‘regime change’ and others feel that the actions taken 
were appropriate in scope and duration. As a result, proportionality and motivation have 
been questioned which “undermine the unanimity that initially existed” (Adams, 2012), 
p. 3. The fallout of the Libyan Civil War, among the estimated 25,000 Libyan soldiers, 
civilians, and rebel deaths was the untimely demise of its leader, President Gaddafi. 
Originally the UN, the ICC, and other international human rights organizations intended 
to bring President Gaddafi to justice and called for an investigation. Unfortunately, 
before that could happen, he was killed in the streets during the Battle of Sirte by rebel 
forces. There were numerous war crimes committed on both sides during the Civil War 
and Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International had raised some concerns about 
the conduct of certain rebel units. The UN acknowledged in the International 
Commission of Inquiry that both pro-Gaddafi and anti-Gaddafi forces had committed 
war crimes which breached international human rights law (OHCHR (119) (120), 
2011). The report also concluded that “those responsible for abuses now are committing 
them on an individual or unit level, and not as part of a system of brutality sanctioned 
by the central government” (OHCHR (39), 2011).  
The culmination of the Libyan Civil War led to a reflection regarding the 
legitimacy of the intervention. Harsh critics of the intervention, such as former South 
African President Thabo Mbeki felt that the intervention in Libya ignored all attempts 
at peaceful resolution, as sought after by the African Union (AU) who attempted to 
bring a panel to Libya to begin discussions of restoring peace within the country 
through diplomatic means. Former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan also spoke up 
against the intervention, but with much more constructive criticism. He expressed 
concern over how quickly regime change came to Libya, because Resolution 1973 was 
 80 
aimed at the protection of civilians, not the removal of dictators. Supporters of the 
implementation of R2P in the Libya case say that it was a turning point in the utilization 
of the principle because the “context, purpose, and effect demonstrated the Security 
Council’s willingness to operationalize the R2P norm- and robustly” (Breakey and 
Frances, 2011, p. 40). All three pillars of R2P were satisfied, the first pillar through the 
failure of the Libyan government to protect its civilians, the second pillar with the 
international community’s willingness to respond and protect, and the third pillar 
through the UNSC authorization for the use of force to “states manifestly violating their 
First Pillar responsibilities” (Breakey and Frances, 2011, p. 40).  
Although Côte d’Ivoire has a history of civil war during which atrocities were 
committed by both sides, the outbreak of violence during the election in 2010-2011 was 
the conclusion of ethnic and political tension that had been fostered since the country’s 
independence from France in 1960. The UNOCI was originally tasked with facilitating 
the implementation of the peace agreement signed in 2003 under Resolution 1528 
(2004) however they remained in the country following the political crisis after the 
election. The intent was to protect civilians, support the Ivorian Government in the 
disarmament process, demobilize and reintegrate former combatants, as well as monitor 
and promote human rights. There was R2P language in the resolutions passed by the 
UNSC “recalling that the Ivorian leaders bear primary responsibility for ensuring peace 
and protecting the civilian population” (1, Resolution 1962 (2010)), but only asked the 
Secretary-General to “facilitate, as appropriate, political dialogue between the Ivorian 
stakeholders in order to ensure peace in Côte d’Ivoire and respecting the outcome of the 
Presidential election” (Paragraph 2). The tone of the resolution was different than the 
resolutions passed in Libya.  
The UN widely credits the humanitarian response as one of the largest and most 
efficient. But they have suffered many setbacks including the violation of ceasefire 
attempts and the near total destruction of the country’s infrastructure and civil society. 
It is within the response though, that it becomes clear the approach the international 
community is taking. They have not invoked R2P as a justification for intervention 
because of a clear lack of geopolitical and economic interests.  R2P is a positive duty, 
but the international community is not taking action.  
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The economic relationship between Libya and the EU is one built on proximity 
and access to the market. Libya has a strong economic relationship with the U.S., 
France, and the U.K, and are responsible for a sizeable portion of the total import and 
export amount. The Security Council decided, with the passing of Resolutions 1970 and 
1975, there were violations of humanitarian rights and acting under the Charter, took a 
stand to stop the violence. The physical proximity to the EU and the location of the 
country was of importance to both the EU and to the U.S. in their relations within the 
region and they acted according to protect those interests. With deploying peacekeepers 
to Côte d’Ivoire, the Security Council declared there was a violation of rights they hold 
important as enshrined in the UN Charter. But neither the economic relationship nor the 
geopolitical interest in Côte d’Ivoire was strong enough to warrant intervention because 
the international community did not gain anything in intervening. In comparison to 
Libya, Côte d’Ivoire was merely another conflict in an area of the world that did not 
attract much attention outside of the region. The gradual push to end the conflict in 
Yemen can be explained with consideration to the factors. There is an economic 
relationship between Saudi Arabia and Yemen, but not necessarily a strong economic 
relationship between Yemen and the P5, nor with the EU. The relationship and 
dependency on Saudi Arabia is much stronger than the relationship with Yemen. The 
UN has repeatedly made it clear that there are gross violations of humanitarian rights 
and mass atrocity crimes are being committed. And through their multiple resolutions 
attempting to curb the violence makes it clear that the UN is trying to do something, 
just not acting as powerfully as in Libya. Saudi Arabia has made it clear that they are in 
charge of the Arabian Peninsula and will not play nice with others. The Yemeni 
population will continue to suffer until the international community decides to take a 
stand against Saudi Arabia and the other members of the GCC.  
In summary, the research done for this thesis sought to demonstrate with the 
presence of economic, social, and geopolitical factors, came the utilization of R2P. In 
the case of Libya, there was an economic relationship between the country, the P5 and 
the EU. The strongest relationship was between the EU and Libya, with China being 
second. The EU accounted for a majority of Libya’s trade prior to the conflict and 
remains a strong trading partner. There were UN Resolutions passed expressing 
international condemnation for the actions that President Gaddafi had taken and the 
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violence he threatened. These resolutions contained steps that should be taken in 
bringing President Gaddafi and his followers to justice. There also were geopolitical 
interests such as the U.S.’ stake in the oil industry and the EU’s interest in stemming 
the flow of migrants coming through Libya onto European soil. In the case of Côte 
d’Ivoire there was not strong economic interest. The strongest relationship that Côte 
d’Ivoire had was with France which was almost equal to the average export total in 
millions of Dollars that Côte d’Ivoire had with the EU. Their weakest economic 
relationship was with Russia. The Security Council passed several resolutions regarding 
Laurent Gbagbo and his supporters, but conflict within the country did not disrupt 
regional stability. Ultimately there was no utilization of R2P. With the current conflict 
in Yemen, the country is facing an economic decline. Any economic relationship the 
country had before the outbreak of violence was overshadowed by their dominant 
neighbor, Saudi Arabia. The presence of the regional power in the conflict has allowed 
the situation to further deteriorate. The UN has passed resolutions on the conflict in 
Yemen, requesting ceasefires and asking for safe passage for medical professionals. 
Yet, the conflict continues. Saudi Arabia controls the geopolitical interests on the 
Arabian Peninsula, so any interest that the international community might have in 
Yemen is overshadowed. The selective implementation of R2P in Libya but not in 
either of the other cases is demonstrative of the interests involved.   
There are limitations to this thesis that should be acknowledged. Only three 
conflicts were analyzed. There was only so much information that could be presented 
within this thesis to stay within the designated parameters. Only the economic trade 
relationship could be analyzed between the case countries because of lack of access to 
databases containing Foreign Direct Investment material. That information would have 
helped demonstrate a stronger economic relationship between the countries. Two 
theoretical lenses were used but not all aspects of each lens were used in the creation of 
the theoretical framework. The exclusion of certain aspects might be seen as a 
limitation, but the intent was to create the tool to analyze the situation on the 
implementation of R2P. These principles that were promoted and applied to the 
conflicts were used to understand each situation and the resulting response.  
With consideration to the limitations of this thesis, there are also several 
contributions. This thesis starts a dialogue, a conversation about the conflict in Côte 
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d’Ivoire and how it received international snub in respect to the similarities with the 
Libyan conflict. There is also potential future contribution in this field with research 
into the situations in Myanmar, Syria, Bahrain, or any of the other conflicts that could 
potentially warrant the utilization of R2P. The goal of the research for this thesis was to 
establish that R2P is not widely used when it should be. There is a gap in the R2P 
literature on analysis of selective implementation that this thesis seeks to help fill and 
inspire future research.  
 In comparing these three conflicts it becomes evident that, despite the 
similarities and severity of the situation, the international community invokes the 
utilization of the R2P principle when it matches the unwritten criteria for intervention, 
the central hypothesis that the convergence of consolidation of power and resources 
with upholding norms and values. While the wording of R2P necessitates intervention 
in specific scenarios, when either of the four violent situations are occurring, the actual 
implementation of R2P demonstrates how actions speak louder than words. This thesis 
will not attempt to provide an alternative principle which might be conveyed as a 
limitation. The purpose was not to propose an alternative, but to highlight the 
misappropriation of the R2P principle. To change the R2P mandate to a requirement 
would cross over into dangerous territory in which the principle could be grossly 
misused and abused. Rather, the intent of the thesis is to demonstrate that if the 
international community is not going to utilize the R2P principle the way it was meant 
to be, then do not have it at all. Do not ignore conflicts because they do not satisfy 
unspoken criteria for intervention. Either intervene under the pretext of R2P or do not 
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